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INTRODUCTION
In November 2014, video surfaced of one of the architects of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA), economist Jonathan Gruber, saying that the ACA—which,
among other things, required individuals without health insurance to purchase
insurance and provided income-based subsidies to help do so—“was written in
a tortured way to make sure [the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)] did not
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score the mandate as taxes. If CBO scored the mandate as taxes, the bill dies.”1
Perhaps primed by the recent Supreme Court decision in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),2 some commentators quickly took
this to be a confession that the bill drafters had deliberately obfuscated in
calling the penalty for failure to buy health insurance3 a penalty rather than a
tax.4 After all, the basis of the NFIB decision, which upheld the ACA, was that
the penalty was actually a tax and therefore fell within Congress’s constitutional
taxing power.5
The commentators were shocked—shocked—that the drafters had misled us,
and they treated this ostensible confession as inflammatory. (It probably didn’t
help that Gruber also referred to “the stupidity of the American voter” in the
same video.)6 The claim was presumably that the American voters would not
have accepted the ACA if they knew the penalty was actually a tax.7
The commentators were wrong, however. Gruber was not talking about the
penalty. He was actually saying something much bigger and potentially much
more inflammatory.
Gruber was actually saying that it was the insurance premiums—the direct
payments from individuals to health insurance companies—that were at risk of
being called “taxes.” The penalties for failure to buy insurance were expected to
raise only $4 billion per year in the first few years of the ACA8 and in any event
1. Jonathan Gruber, Remarks at the 2013 Annual Health Economics Conference (Oct. 17, 2013),
http://ldi.upenn.edu/ahec2013/agenda [http://perma.cc/YNL3-URTC].
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. The ACA backed up its requirement to purchase insurance with a penalty called a “shared
responsibility payment” for those who did not. I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2012).
4. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Did the Author of Obamacare Admit It’s Evil?, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 13,
2014, 8:38 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/11/did-the-author-of-obamacare-admit-its-
evil.html [http://perma.cc/57HP-RA8P]; Charles Krauthammer, The Gruber Confession, WASH. POST
(Nov. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-the-gruber-confession/
2014/11/13/474595bc-6b6b-11e4-9fb4-a622dae742a2_story.html [https://perma.cc/A2UK-VKHY]; Marc
A. Thiessen, Thanks to Jonathan Gruber for Revealing Obamacare Deception, WASH. POST (Nov.
17, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-thanks-to-jonathan-gruber-for-
revealing-obamacare-deception/2014/11/17/356514b2-6e72-11e4-893f-86bd390a3340_story.html [https://
perma.cc/9492-3S29].
5. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–97.
6. Avik Roy, ACA Architect:‘The Stupidity of the American Voter’ Led Us to Hide Obamacare’s True
Costs from the Public, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2014, 5:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/20
14/11/10/aca-architect-the-stupidity-of-the-american-voter-led-us-to-hide-obamacares-tax-hikes-and-
subsidies-from-the-public [http://perma.cc/LY32-MLDQ].
7. The ACA votes were almost entirely on party lines. The bill passed the House with no Republican
votes. After the death of Senator Ted Kennedy and the subsequent election of Senator Scott Brown, the
House bill would not have withstood a filibuster in the Senate, and so congressional Democrats instead
used a process called “reconciliation” to pass a bill in the Senate with a simple majority. See Emily
Smith, Timeline of the Health Care Law, CNN (June 28, 2012, 10:42 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
06/28/politics/supreme-court-health-timeline [http://perma.cc/N8W9-MRK9]. This illustrates that pas-
sage was narrow and nearly failed, and so some commentators believed that even small obfuscations
could have made a material difference.
8. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1 (2010), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/43627 [http://perma.
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were always scored9 by CBO as government revenue10—not a lot of political
risk there. In contrast, the mandated premium payments through the exchanges
are currently running around $51 billion per year11 and are likely to get
bigger12—if that were seen as a tax increase, the bill would have been in serious
jeopardy.
But this would require treating direct payments from individuals to insurance
companies as taxes—was there really much risk that CBO would do that? Quite
a lot, actually, because that is precisely what CBO did in scoring the similar
1993 Clinton health-reform bill.13 And, indeed, it was reasonable to do so. The
mere fact that payment goes from an individual to a provider of a good or
service, rather than first running through government—that is, calling a pay-
ment a “price” rather than a “tax”—does not make it any less public spending if
the payment is mandated and especially if the payment is income-based like our
income taxes. Indeed, this Article claims that this structure—mandated or
strongly encouraged payments directly from individuals to good or service
providers, rather than to the government—may actually be the future of Ameri-
can public spending.
This Article introduces the concept of “quasi-public spending” to describe
this type of policy, whereby public provision of goods and services is effected
not through direct, tax-funded government programs, as is common in continen-
tal Europe, but rather through a mixture of individuals’ direct expenditures
driven by government subsidies and mandates, smaller scale taxes to make
distributional adjustments, and heavy public regulation of the private market.
Thus, rather than pay a tax to the government in exchange for the good or
service, individuals are encouraged (or required) to purchase the good or service
cc/J6VR-VHFT]. In 2014, CBO confirmed the $4 billion estimate for those uninsured in 2016 and
estimated $5 billion per year in revenue for years 2017–2024. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF
PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: 2014 UPDATE 1 (2014), https://www.
cbo.gov/publication/45397 [http://perma.cc/H3JV-7QF4].
9. In budget jargon, “scoring” or “scorekeeping” is the process of estimating government receipts
and outlays for purposes of complying with budget rules. See, e.g., Tax Topics: The Federal Budget,
TAX POL’Y CTR., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/budget/concepts.cfm [http://perma.cc/M7HM-
87EM] (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
10. See, e.g., Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives tbl.2 (Mar. 20, 2010), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/21351
[http://perma.cc/VY83-8XHT] (showing penalties for failure to purchase insurance as a revenue line).
11. My estimate is based on 11.7 million people enrolled through the state or federal exchanges
paying an average monthly pre-tax premium of $364, which is the average premium for the thirty-seven
states using the healthcare.gov platform. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE
MARKETPLACES 2015 OPEN ENROLLMENT PERIOD: MARCH ENROLLMENT REPORT 5 tbl.1, 51 tbl.B7 (2015). I
use the pretax premium amount because that is, essentially, the cost of the good. The premium
assistance tax credits are additional government spending (in the form of tax expenditures) to make
distributional adjustments to help individuals afford the good.
12. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
13. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S HEALTH PROPOSAL 44, 46 (1994),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/103rd-congress-1993-1994/reports/doc07.pdf [http://perma.cc/
RM54-B6XT].
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directly, but with government subsidies (raised from lower taxes) to address
distributional issues, and regulations to ensure that the good or service is
provided consistent with public programmatic goals. The result is financing of a
good or service in a similar manner as from a direct public spending program
but accomplished through a combination of private and public spending. To be
clear, the emphasis is on financing—the discussion here is focused on different
ways to pay for a good publicly. The good itself may be provided by either
public or private entities.14
Though the legal literature sometimes imagines a sharp line between the
private and the public,15 there is, in reality, a continuum between private and
public spending with varying degrees of government money and involvement.
For example, there is a great deal of government-subsidized private spending,
such as with housing, and also private spending on public goods, such as with
charitable contributions. This is well understood. I aim in this Article, however,
to describe a space on that continuum that has been underexplored and undertheo-
rized in the literature, namely where private spending on goods for individual
consumption takes on such an overlay of regulation and cross-subsidization16 as
to be far on the “public” end of the continuum—where payment for the good
moves from being government-subsidized private spending to being, in effect, a
substitute for direct public spending. This Article thus sets out to describe and
analyze quasi-public spending as a policy alternative to direct public spending
and to provide recommendations for when and how policymakers should con-
sider using quasi-public spending to achieve public policy goals.
The primary examples this Article uses for existing quasi-public spending
programs are post-ACA health insurance and federal loan–financed higher
education. As this Article will describe, both of these programs are structured
around private payments directly from individuals to providers, but with a set of
distributional adjustments (and, in the case of health insurance, mandates) that
make the financing of the programs collective and progressive in a manner
similar to direct public spending.17 As a result, this Article argues that we
should think of these programs as financially comparable to direct public
spending and analyze them accordingly.
14. For example, I compare income-driven student loans to direct government tuition payments, but
in both cases flowing to an existing set of higher education institutions (public and private). A full
government takeover of all higher education, however, would be a very different policy (though still
financially comparable).
15. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543
(2000) (discussing and challenging the traditional administrative law view of the public/private
distinction); Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1427 (1982) (noting the distinction’s “surprising vitality”).
16. By cross-subsidization, I mean any system whereby the price for a good paid by one person goes
in part to subsidize the price paid by another person, especially because of legal rules or institutional
structures. For example, healthy people cross-subsidize the sick in group-rated health insurance plans
and urban stamp-buyers cross-subsidize rural postal delivery.
17. See infra Part I.
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That comparison yields several important differences between direct public
spending and quasi-public spending. First, with quasi-public spending, much of
the spending on the good or service is “off-budget”—because individual spend-
ing goes directly to the provider of the good, rather than to the government first,
it does not add to the nominal size of the public sector nor increase nominal
taxes. There may still be direct costs for the government, but much fewer than if
the government supplied the good or service directly. This is the most important
difference because, as this Article will discuss, government budgets may have a
political ceiling that would otherwise limit the ability of policymakers to
achieve public policy goals.
Second, quasi-public spending is likely to be more complex and opaque to
individuals than a comparable direct public spending program. A number of
scholars and commentators have criticized similar forms of hidden government
spending. At least as far back as the 1960s and ’70s, scholars have criticized tax
expenditures as disguised public spending,18 and more recently there has been a
surge of academic work describing the “submerged state,”19 the “delegated
welfare state,”20 the “divided welfare state,”21 the “Rube Goldberg state,”22 the
“hidden welfare state,”23 and even “kludgeocracy.”24 These critiques focus in
varying degrees on concerns that complexity and opacity can lead to upward
redistribution and declining political involvement, that social programs are
increasingly administered by private actors with private incentives, and that
complexity in general is inefficient and can hide rent-seeking and other antipub-
lic behaviors, among other criticisms.
Although these are valid and important criticisms, this Article aims to compli-
cate the discussion for several reasons. For example, complexity is not unique
to quasi-public spending, nor is it necessary. Direct government activity can
also be complex and opaque and thereby more conducive to interest group
politics, rent-seeking, and even corruption—just consider the Pentagon’s bud-
get.25 In principle, a quasi-public spending program could be designed in a
simple and open way.
18. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973).
19. See SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES UNDERMINE
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011).
20. See KIMBERLY J. MORGAN & ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, THE DELEGATED WELFARE STATE: MEDICARE,
MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL POLICY (2011).
21. See JACOB S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002).
22. See Elisabeth S. Clemens, Lineages of the Rube Goldberg State: Building and Blurring Public
Programs, 1900–1940, in RETHINKING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ART OF THE STATE 187, 187 (Ian
Shapiro, Stephen Skowronek & Daniel Galvin eds., 2006).
23. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN
THE UNITED STATES (1997) [hereinafter HOWARD, HIDDEN WELFARE STATE]. See also CHRISTOPHER HOWARD,
THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY (2007).
24. See Steven M. Teles, Kludgeocracy in America, 17 NAT’L AFFAIRS 97 (2013).
25. See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, Special Report: The Pentagon’s Doctored Ledgers Conceal Epic
Waste, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:56 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pentagon-waste-
specialreport-idUSBRE9AH0LQ20131118 [http://perma.cc/U73Y-LVTC].
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Moreover, quasi-public spending may actually reveal a connection between
payment and benefit that is opaque in direct public spending. A health insurance
premium, even a subsidized one, is more clearly connected to the delivery of
health care than a general income tax payment would be. This could potentially
lead to more civic engagement and political involvement, at least with respect to
the given policy, if not government more broadly.26 Social Security, for ex-
ample, has achieved an impressive level of political strength in part through a
similar structure.27 Furthermore, although using institutions other than govern-
ment to deliver the good may lead to complexity and opacity, there may be
offsetting public choice benefits from having more diffusion of power and
budgetary control. For these and other reasons, complexity may not always cut
against quasi-public spending as a policy tool.
The third key feature of a quasi-public spending program is that quasi-public
spending overlays upon existing markets and institutions, both public and
private, rather than replacing them. The cases of health insurance and higher
education show that quasi-public spending can be achieved through a set of
iterative changes to existing institutions rather than the creation of new institu-
tions. Indeed, in both cases, synthesizing a system similar to direct public
spending was not the explicit goal of the reforms—even though, as I argue here,
it was ultimately the effect. Quasi-public spending can thus arise accidentally or
as a byproduct of other changes. Furthermore, the efficacy of a quasi-public
spending program may be limited by the existing institutional landscape.
Finally, because the revenue for the program is not necessarily raised through
the tax system, policymakers may have a broader set of policy instruments at
their disposal to manage allocational and distributional issues. For example,
with loan-financed higher education, distributional adjustments are made through
the loan repayment schedule rather than through the tax system. That flexibility
can be a useful tool in policy design, but it means that a quasi-public spending
program may have different distributional effects than a comparable tax-funded
direct public spending program.
With these key differences in mind, the question then becomes: should
policymakers deliberately use quasi-public spending, and if so, how? Contrary
to some existing scholarship,28 this Article finds that, in some situations,
quasi-public spending may be effective, particularly when political or otherwise
artificial budget constraints limit the ability to use direct public spending. But
the complexity of quasi-public spending and its reliance on existing institutions,
among other limitations, mean that in some situations it will fail to achieve its
goals.29 Policymakers must therefore step carefully, because, as noted above,
26. See infra Section IV.B.2.
27. See MOLLY C. MICHELMORE, TAX AND SPEND: THE WELFARE STATE, TAX POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 39 (2012).
28. See supra notes 18–24.
29. See infra Sections IV.B–C.
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quasi-public spending may arise as the by-product of other iterative reforms,
rather than as a deliberate goal.
In describing programs such as post-ACA health insurance and income-
driven student loan repayment as quasi-public spending, this Article aims to
expand the boundaries of tax-policy analysis beyond the traditional “tax” and
“spend” categories. The Article thus contributes to the literature on tax expendi-
tures, which has also worked to explode these distinctions.30 Under tax-
expenditure analysis, credits, deductions, exclusions, and similar tax provisions
that deviate from some normative tax baseline are conceptualized not as tax cuts
but rather as disguised public spending.31 For example, tax-expenditure analysis
considers the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance and health care
from the definition of gross income to be not a proper adjustment in measuring
a person’s income, but rather to be disguised public spending of around $157
billion per year toward health care.32 But that money appears as lower taxes,
rather than higher spending, and furthermore does not go through the typical
budget appropriations process.33
What this Article reveals is that tax-expenditure analysis is too limited and
that there are a number of other situations with the same effect—disguised,
off-budget public spending—that do not qualify as tax expenditures, simply
because they are not accomplished through the Tax Code.34 Income-driven
student loan repayment, for example, operates as a quasi-public spending
program in my view yet involves few tax law provisions.35 But the spending is
nonetheless disguised because of how budget rules treat federal loans.36 Thus,
an important contribution of this Article is to expand the tools of tax-
expenditure analysis to other nontax situations.
30. See, e.g., SURREY, supra note 18; Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax Expenditures and Fiscal
Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187 (2004); Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 1155; David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 113
YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
31. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS
2014–2018, at 2–8 (2015) (discussing the tax-expenditure concept and the normal baseline).
32. Id. at 31.
33. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman & Marvin Phaup, Tax Expenditures, the Size and Efficiency of
Government, and Implications for Budget Reform, 26 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 93, 114–17 (2012) (discussing
differences in budget processes for direct expenditures and tax expenditures).
34. There are also a number of tax expenditures that would not qualify as quasi-public spending in
my view because they are simply transfers or have some other policy goals: accelerated depreciation,
the mortgage interest deduction, and the deferral of income for controlled foreign corporations, for
example.
35. Although there are tax deductions and credits for higher education, they are largely irrelevant to
the progressivity built into the student loan program, which is my focus. See infra Section I.B.
Furthermore, they may not even be that effective. See, e.g., George B. Bulman & Caroline M. Hoxby,
The Returns to the Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20833, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20833 [http://perma.cc/4EF4-JQ44]
(finding that the tax credits have “negligible causal effects” on attendance).
36. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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A second, and related, contribution of this Article is to make explicit that the
size of the public sector—even including the tax-expenditure budget—is an
incomplete measure of a nation’s collective public activity. As an illustration of
this, consider that the U.S. public sector today is about 37% of GDP, compared
to 50% or higher for much of Europe.37 But if we include just the U.S.
quasi-public spending programs for health care and higher education, the U.S.
total comes close to 50% of GDP.38 Although there are still large differences in
European and U.S. approaches to public finance, the differences today are more
about institutional design than about deeper issues of social welfare.
This Article also contributes to the literature on disguised government action
generally. Historians and scholars of government have argued that the United
States has a pattern of regulating and governing “out of sight,” often by
delegating its power to other actors.39 Tax expenditures are therefore just one
example of a broader trend that historians have traced back even to the colonial
period—contrary to the myth, especially pervasive in the legal literature, of the
United States’ laissez-faire origins. Quasi-public spending can thus be viewed
as the latest iteration of this broader historical tendency. Furthermore, because
this approach to American governance appears to be the norm rather than the
exception, we should expect future examples of, or opportunities for, quasi-
public spending to arise. It is thus imperative for scholars and policymakers to
think through the ramifications, and another important contribution of this
Article is a suggested framework for doing so.
Finally, this Article also relates to the literature on government mandates and
cross-subsidization. It is well-known that the government often substitutes
mandated private spending for public spending. A minimum-wage law, for
example, is a rough substitute for a government wage subsidy, and rent-control
and affordable-housing laws are substitutes for public housing or rent subsidies.
There is a large economics literature analyzing these issues, some of which this
Article will discuss.40 The important qualification with quasi-public spending,
however, is that the direct public spending (whether mandated or not) is by the
person who is receiving the good rather than the person supplying it. Minimum-
wage and rent-control laws, for example, are entirely transfers from one group
to another; quasi-public spending, by contrast, is more focused on provision of a
37. See LANE KENWORTHY, SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AMERICA 10–11 (2014) (summarizing data).
38. See OECD, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE 2014, at 222 fig.B2.1 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/edu/
Education-at-a-Glance-2014.pdf [http://perma.cc/XF6H-72M6] (showing 2.7% of GDP consisted of
expenditures on public and private tertiary education); Health Expenditure, Private (% of GDP),
WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.PRIV.ZS [http://perma.cc/22NP-TYP2] (last
visited Jan. 12, 2016) (showing health care is 9% of GDP).
39. See, e.g., BRIAN BALOGH, A GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT: THE MYSTERY OF NATIONAL AUTHORITY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); HOWARD, HIDDEN WELFARE STATE, supra note 23; JOHN LAURITZ
LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN
THE EARLY UNITED STATES (2001); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Clemens, supra note 22.
40. See infra Section IV.D.
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good, with distributional adjustments playing a secondary role. Although this
may not substantially change the economic analysis, it is still a distinct ap-
proach to policymaking and institutional design.
Before proceeding, a few important caveats. First, as noted above, “public”
and “private” are not discrete categories, but operate on a continuum, and there
are thus gray areas and judgment calls. Reasonable minds will differ on when a
system of regulation and cross-subsidization moves from being mostly private
to mostly public. I do not intend to provide a strict bright-line definition of what
is and is not quasi-public spending; rather, I intend the concept to be an analytic
tool in understanding the effect of a subset of government policies. Further-
more, I intend the concept to be a guide to future policymakers considering
different instruments to accomplish public policy goals, particularly in the face
of budget constraints.
Second, this Article is not suggesting that quasi-public spending is a first- (or
even second-) best approach to provision of public goods and management of
distributional issues.41 Welfare economics, and optimal tax theory in particular,
have much to say on that point, and the general conclusion is that cross-
subsidization as a way to finance public goods is inferior to income taxation and
that distributional issues affecting individuals’ abilities to purchase optimal
amounts of goods are better addressed through cash grants than with subsidies
or in-kind transfers.42 There are important first-order qualifications to these
conclusions, but ultimately a main purpose of this Article is descriptive—the
United States is already using quasi-public spending to collectively pay for
goods, and it is vital that we understand it as a policy instrument. We also need
to understand that the realities of U.S. policymaking will drive policymakers to
use quasi-public spending in the future, and so it is also vital that we provide
some guidance for doing so. This Article is not arguing that we necessarily
ought to be using quasi-public spending, but that if we are going to use it, we
should understand when it will work and when it will not.
41. In other words, this is an exercise in nonideal theory; that is, this is a theory for a way to improve
the normative results of public-finance policy making in a world of only partial compliance with
broader principles of justice. See, e.g., LIAM B. MURPHY, MORAL DEMANDS IN NONIDEAL THEORY 5–8
(2000); Laura Valentini, Ideal v. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map, 7 PHIL. COMPASS 654, 655–56
(2012); cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 245–46 (1971); AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 90
(2009). In a Rawlsian framework, for example, the first-best solution to the high costs and distributional
problems might be a guaranteed minimum income or large demogrant, which could make moot nearly
all the suggestions here. But the political and economic realities of our world—not the least of which is
the difficulty of taxing wealth in a world of sovereign nation-states and global capital mobility—make
such a proposal nearly impossible. That said, a reasonable criticism of this proposal is that embedding
distributional instruments within individual programs that could persist and become sticky could make
it more difficult to achieve a broader solution to distributional problems. See generally R. G. Lipsey &
Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
42. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 127–35 (2008)
(discussing the theoretical superiority of income taxation over differential commodity taxation, of
which cross-subsidization is one form); id. at 175–78 (discussing cash versus in-kind grants).
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the ACA and income-driven
student loan repayment, describing how each program operates as a substitute
for direct public spending. Part II presents some of the reasons for high and
growing government budgets because the political ceiling on the size of govern-
ment is a key motivator for policymakers to take advantage of quasi-public
spending. Part III discusses the structure of quasi-public spending in more detail
and contrasts it with some similar forms of government intervention. Part IV
examines in detail the unique features of quasi-public spending as compared to
direct public spending. This Part emphasizes that much of the spending is
off-budget and that a quasi-public spending program is likely to be complex.
Although both of these features have given some commentators pause, I provide
a qualified defense of each. I also note that quasi-public spending can take
advantage of existing institutions and provide more design flexibility, which can
be used to minimize some of the costs of traditional taxation. Part V uses the
preceding analysis to derive a framework for helping policymakers to determine
whether quasi-public spending is feasible and reasonable. Because of its particu-
lar features, quasi-public spending will not be suitable to all settings, even
where policymakers might have worthwhile goals. Part VI applies that frame-
work preliminarily to several other policy areas.
I. HEALTH CARE AND HIGHER EDUCATION: THE NEW PUBLIC SPENDING
This Article proceeds first from the observation that two of the biggest public
programs of recent years from a public-finance perspective—the ACA for health
insurance and income-driven repayment for federal student loans—suggest a
new model for public spending. Through these programs, health care and higher
education are financed in a way similar in effect to tax-funded direct public
spending but with many of the payments running directly from individuals to
providers rather than to the government. While the government’s role is thus
nominally limited to distributional adjustments and market regulation, it still
asserts itself strongly over the provision of the good itself—but it does so
indirectly, through mandates and other forms of encouragement. To inform the
discussion that follows in the Article, I first describe these programs in more
detail.
A. HEALTH CARE
A full treatment of the complex and diverse health care system is beyond the
scope of this Article, as is an examination of all of the effects and provisions of
the ACA. But from a public-finance perspective, some broad observations are
instructive.
Looking first at just the ACA, the financing structure is roughly as follows.
Individuals without other health insurance coverage are required to buy insur-
ance on the private market through insurance exchanges, but with income-based
subsidies for low-income individuals (including premium assistance tax credits
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and the effective 100% subsidy through expanded Medicaid) and additional
revenue to pay for the subsidies from high-income individuals (all high-income
individuals, not just those purchasing on the insurance exchanges). That addi-
tional revenue comes from several tax instruments, especially the Medicare
surtax,43 the tax on net investment income,44 a higher floor on deductible
medical expenses,45 and the excise tax on “Cadillac” health plans.46 These
distributional adjustments cause the net payments (or transfers) for health
insurance to be generally income-based and progressive.
From a budgetary perspective, the government’s costs come (largely) from
the premium assistance tax credits and the expansion of Medicaid, and the
revenue comes from these more limited taxes. Contrast this with the health
care system in the United Kingdom or Canada, where the budget costs would
include the full cost of health care and the revenue would be the much higher
income and other taxes needed to pay those costs. What’s the difference? The
insurance premium portion. The portion making up the private insurance pre-
mium payment in the United States would instead be a tax payment in the
United Kingdom or Canada. But if the premium payment is mandated by the
government, is it so different from a tax? Either way, the money starts with an
individual and ends up in the hands of a provider. Thus, the combination of
mandated premium payments and the government’s distributional adjustments
provide a financing structure not so different in effect from the United Kingdom
and Canada, to a first approximation.
The health care system in the United States is not limited to the ACA,
however. Most health insurance in the United States continues to be provided
through the pre-ACA system—a combination of employer-provided health
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. The provision of insurance by employers is
encouraged through tax subsidies, in the form of an exclusion of employer-
provided health insurance from gross income for tax purposes47 and by a
mandate on some employers. The subsidies are regressive in effect, however,
because they are a function of marginal tax rates—Stanley Surrey’s classic
“upside-down” subsidy.48 Thus, with respect to the employer portion, the
system lacks some of the distributional effects of a direct public spending
program.
43. I.R.C. § 1401(b)(2)(A) (2012) (imposing an additional Medicare tax of 0.9% on self-
employment income); § 3101(b)(2) (imposing an additional Medicare tax of 0.9% on wages).
44. Id. § 1411 (imposing a 3.8% tax on income from “interest, dividends, annuities, royalties,” rents,
and capital gains to the extent that they exceed a threshold amount).
45. Id. § 213(a), (c)(1) (allowing a deduction for medical expenses that exceed 10% of adjusted
gross income (AGI), as opposed to the earlier floor of 7.5% of AGI prior to 2012).
46. See id. § 4980I(a).
47. See id. §§ 105(a), 106(a).
48. A subsidy in the form of a tax deduction or exclusion (such as the exclusion for employer-
provided health insurance) provides a transfer equal to the expenditure amount times the taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate. Thus, those in higher brackets get a larger subsidy as a percentage of the expenditure—
hence “upside-down” subsidy. See SURREY, supra note 18, at 37–38.
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The ACA financing structure is undoubtedly complex, and its interaction with
the old employer-provided system compounds the complexity. How the two
systems will interact remains to be seen, but for many individuals, the net cost
of exchange-purchased insurance may be less than the net cost of employer-
provided insurance.49 Furthermore, because the premium assistance tax credits
are likely to grow faster than incomes,50 the group of individuals that would be
better off on the exchanges is likely to grow over time. Currently, an individual
is not eligible for exchange subsidies if his employer offers health insurance,51
but it may be relatively easy for employers to avoid this mandate.52 Thus, we
should expect that more and more individuals will gradually shift away from the
employer-provided system and toward the exchanges over time, which would
cause the two systems to converge toward individual subsidized purchases on
the insurance exchanges. This would suggest that quasi-public spending will
become the dominant form of health care spending outside of Medicare and
Medicaid.
Although the ACA may describe the long-term structure of our health insur-
ance system—and its passage was, of course, a huge political battle—it was still
an iterative change to the existing health insurance system, with its existing set
of mandates, private spending, direct public spending, and tax expenditures.
The ACA was intended to work alongside the existing institutions. Contrast that
with, for example, a wholesale nationalization of health care, or the creation of
a single-payer insurance company, either of which would have replaced a good
swath of the existing institutions. As I discuss below, the ability to use existing
institutions is an important feature of quasi-public spending.53
B. HIGHER EDUCATION
As I have written elsewhere, the new income-driven repayment student loan
programs allow for a form of collective and progressive funding for higher
education but with much of the spending kept nominally off-budget and instead
49. See David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare Reform:
Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income Workers,
65 TAX L. REV. 669, 690–91 (2012) (showing that the exchange subsidies and tax credits are more
valuable than the tax exclusion for a family of four with income up to 400% of the federal poverty
line).
50. The percentages of income at which net premium payments are capped by the premium
assistance tax credits are indexed to grow to the extent that the rate of premium growth exceeds the
combined rate of growth for income and inflation (as it likely will). See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(ii)
(2012).
51. See id. § 36B(c)(2)(B) (denying eligibility for a given month if the applicable taxpayer has
minimum essential coverage under, inter alia, an employer-sponsored plan).
52. See Gamage, supra note 49, at 694; Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Saving Small-
Employer Health Insurance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1935, 1950–64 (2013); Amy Monahan & Daniel
Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform By Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L.
REV. 125, 153–71 (2011).
53. See infra Section IV.C.
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appearing similar to individual expenditures.54 Any student can borrow money
from the federal government to pay for higher education, and thus a large
portion of tuition is paid for with government funds, even though it is structured
as a “loan.”55
I say “loan” because the repayment terms for federal student loans differ in
dramatic ways from a traditional bank loan. Under the current Pay As You Earn
(PAYE) plan,56 any federal loan borrower’s monthly payments are no greater
than 10% of her discretionary income,57 and any outstanding balance after a
maximum of twenty years is forgiven.58 Thus, for some borrowers, the govern-
ment effectively pays their tuition, and the borrowers simply pay 10% of
discretionary income—effectively a 10% income surtax. This is not so different—
again, to a first approximation—from a world where tuition is free, financed by
higher income tax rates.59
Moreover, even though the funds flow through the government (and poten-
tially out to a government entity, if the student attends a public university), most
of the payments are nominally off-budget. This is because of the loan structure—
the vast majority of the federal outlays on higher education come in the form of
a loan to the student rather than a direct outlay. Under budget rules, the
government records only the expected difference between outlays and receipts
on the loan as a budgetary cost,60 which is only a small fraction of the nominal
amount of money actually loaned to pay tuitions. This makes the budgetary
cost, at most, a few billion dollars per year rather than $100 billion.61
There is no mandate comparable to the mandates in health insurance; the
government does not require everyone to attend college or to take out a loan to
do so. But there is what we could call a “social mandate,” that is, a softer form
of requirement, because for certain careers higher education is essentially
mandated. This is in contrast to health care, where the lack of insurance is not a
barrier to many forms of health care.62 Furthermore, loans are increasingly
necessary to pay high tuition costs, and the federal government now issues 90%
54. See John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of Higher Education,
104 GEO. L.J. 229 (2016).
55. See id. at 251–63.
56. Income-Contingent Repayment Plans, 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a) (2015).
57. Discretionary income is AGI minus 150% of the relevant poverty line. Id. § 685.209(a)(1)(v);
see Brooks, supra note 54, at 233 n.17.
58. 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(a)(6); see Brooks, supra note 54, at 253.
59. An important difference between the ACA and PAYE is that ACA taxes mostly apply to all
taxpayers, whereas the PAYE “tax” in the form of an income-driven repayment amount applies only to
borrowers. There are arguments for and against having the taxes apply only to those in the pool. See
infra Section IV.D; Brooks, supra note 54, at 268–74. But in the case of the ACA, the design difference
is not as big as it seems because the pool of health care consumers is essentially all individuals.
60. See Federal Credit Reform Act § 502(5)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 661a(5)(B) (2012); Brooks, supra note
54, at 256.
61. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 256–58.
62. For example, emergency-room services must be provided regardless of whether a person is
insured. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
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of all student loans.63 So, though not mandated, federal-loan-financed higher
education is the norm.
The complex structure of PAYE raises a number of practical design consider-
ations, such as managing adverse selection, avoiding unconstrained price in-
creases by schools, and the question of how much of the burden should be
placed on high-income students (via higher loan payments) or on taxpayers
generally. I explore these at length in my article on income-driven student loan
repayment.64 But they suggest a need for government regulation, which is
already beginning to appear.65
Adoption of PAYE is still relatively light, though rapidly growing.66 It has
been available for new loans since roughly 2012, but a form of income-driven
repayment for older loans will become available July 1, 2016, under the new
Revised Pay As You Earn (REPAYE) program.67 And if tuitions continue to rise,
we should expect more and more students to take advantage of the program. If
so, much of higher education tuition spending may become simply a function of
the student’s future income.
Although I have argued that this is a huge change in the way we publicly
finance higher education,68 the structure of the change itself was small—simply
changing the repayment terms for a student loan and adding a forgiveness
provision. Thus, again, the quasi-public spending program comes about through
an iterative change to existing institutions and law, and it continues to work
largely within the landscape of existing institutions. Contrast this with national-
izing higher education institutions or making the government the direct payer of
tuition.
63. See COLLEGE BD., TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 16 fig.5 (2014) (showing federal and nonfederal loan
dollars in 2013 dollars from 1993–1994 to 2013–2014); Composition of Total Aid and Nonfederal
Loans over Time, COLLEGE BD., http://trends.collegeboard.org/student-aid/figures-tables/composition-total-
aid-and-nonfederal-loans-over-time [http://perma.cc/MZB8-ZQP7] (last visited Jan. 29, 2016); Brooks,
supra note 54, at 251 n.125.
64. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 263–70.
65. For example, the Obama Administration recently issued the Gainful Employment regulations,
addressing issues of for-profit schools with high student debt and low postgraduation employment. See
34 C.F.R. §§ 600, 668; Brooks, supra note 54, at 286 n.329. The Obama Administration has started
publishing information addressing cost and employment for nonprofit schools. See COLLEGE SCORE
CARD, https://collegescorecard.ed.gov [http://perma.cc/SW5W-JFT4] (last visited Feb. 15, 2016). It has
also expressed interest in more regulation and oversight. See Michael D. Shear, With Website to
Research Colleges, Obama Abandons Ranking System, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/09/13/us/with-website-to-research-colleges-obama-abandons-ranking-system.html?_r0
[https://perma.cc/7CPY-W27U].
66. For the first quarter of 2016, total enrollment in PAYE or IBR reached nearly 4 million
borrowers and $210 billion outstanding, up from about 2.5 million borrowers and $132 billion
outstanding one year earlier. See Federal Student Loan Portfolio, FED. STUDENT AID, https://studentaid.ed.
gov/sa/about/data-center/student/portfolio [http://perma.cc/A8HC-VYFY] (click on “Direct Loan Portfo-
lio by Repayment Plan”) (last visited Apr. 3, 2016).
67. See 34 C.F.R. § 685.209(c).
68. Brooks, supra note 54.
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C. SUMMARY
The ACA and PAYE are both still in their infancy, and both still account for a
relatively small portion of spending on health insurance and higher education,
respectively. But each is growing and may become the dominant financing
vehicle for their respective goods, absent other policy changes.
The ACA combines mandated payments from individuals directly to provid-
ers with tax-funded distributional adjustments from the government to individu-
als. The net cost of the two for a given individual will be, in part, a function of
income, just as an income-tax payment would. That financing structure, coupled
with the heavy public regulation of providers, is thus comparable to tax-funded
direct public spending on health care.
Income-driven repayment, and PAYE in particular, provide for nominal
payment of tuition by individuals to schools, but with the cash to finance it
coming from the government in the form of a loan. Because the student is only
required to pay back the loan as a function of income, with possible loan
forgiveness, the net cost for a given individual will also be, in part, a function of
income, just as an income-tax payment would. That financing structure, coupled
with existing and potential future regulation of providers, is thus comparable to
tax-funded direct public spending on higher education.
These are not minor policies. Health care and higher education are two
massive and growing portions of our economy, addressing central parts of our
lives and our individual and collective well-being. Understanding them fully not
only helps to explain important parts of our public finance system and our
economy, but may also provide some guidance for how policy will be made in
the future, particularly in an era of growing government spending and tight
government budget constraints. These two programs, therefore, point toward a
model of quasi-public spending, which Parts III and IV discuss in detail.
II. BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND THE GROWING PUBLIC SECTOR
Before turning to a fuller analysis of quasi-public spending, it is worth
understanding the motivations of policymakers, at least in the area of health
care and higher education, to use quasi-public spending as a policy tool. I
discuss some of the key differences between quasi-public spending and direct
public spending in Part IV, and likely all of those factors play a role. But
because the primary feature of quasi-public spending is off-budget spending,
policymakers are likely to be motivated especially by large and growing
government budgets and the political ceiling they impose on direct public
spending. Therefore, this Part briefly sketches out some of the reasons for why
government budgets are large and growing, and the political effect this has.
As evidenced by the ACA anecdote that began this Article, there are real
political constraints on public spending.69 The nominal amounts of taxes and
69. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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spending and the nominal size of the public sector have enormous political
salience to the degree that our political process has become consumed by
budget battles, supercommittees, shutdowns, and default threats, driven in part
by a concern that the government is simply spending too much money.70 Some
in Congress have also tried, either in legislation or in budget negotiations, to
lock in public spending as a fixed percentage of GDP.71 Thus, it seems plausible
that voters may tolerate only so large a nominal public sector.72 And this is not
unreasonable. Involving the public sector raises issues of public choice, liberty,
subsidiarity, administrative efficiency, and all the other issues that arise in
considering public versus private action.73 Thus, there are real costs to moving
the provision of a good into the public sector.
Yet at the same time, these political budget constraints are somewhat artificial
in the sense that they are based on rough heuristics about how big government
should be and not on reasoned conclusions about whether the public sector
should be engaging (or not) in particular activities. Statements like government
is spending “too much” or “not enough” tell us very little. Indeed, surveys tend
to show that voters are actually in favor of many specific government programs,
even while they may object to taxes or “government” in general.74
The problem with this is that we can clearly observe that the public sector in
modern, developed welfare states is quite large and growing.75 Although there
are certainly places for cost-cutting and reform, there are also good reasons why
the public sector is and will remain big—namely, that it disproportionately
70. See, e.g., Associated Press, Budget Battle 2013: Lawmakers Blame Each Other as Government
Shutdown Looms, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 22, 2013, 2:40 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
politics/budget-battle-2013-lawmakers-blame-government-shutdown-looms-article-1.1463901 [https://
perma.cc/VF3J-UPL8]; Steven Erlanger, Default Threat Generates Fear Around Globe, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/08/us/politics/default-threat-makes-impasse-in-
washington-a-global-fear.html [https://perma.cc/VUZ6-J5WJ] (reporting on the international fear gener-
ated by the threat of a default by the U.S. government); Josh Hicks, Top 10 Stories from the 2013
Budget Battles, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/201
3/12/31/top-10-stories-from-the-2013-budget-battles/ [http://perma.cc/VD47-WAZZ] (gathering news
stories from the budget battle in 2013, including stories about the sequester, shutdown, and ultimate
budget deal); Tom Raum, Congressional Supercommittees’ Recommendations Seldom Spur Action on
Capitol Hill, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/01/
congressional-supercommittee_n_4367963.html [http://perma.cc/SAL7-PWZ9] (discussing the mostly
unsuccessful history of congressional “supercommittees,” including the 2010–2011 Simpson–Bowles
deficit-reduction panel).
71. See, e.g., Returning to Responsible Fiscal Policies Act, H.R. 2041, 112th Cong. § 3(b) (2011);
Ezra Klein, The Misguided 18 Percent Budget Solution, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Dec. 5, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2012-12-05/the-misguided-18-percent-budget-solution [https://
perma.cc/3Q4G-6F8Q].
72. See, e.g., KENWORTHY, supra note 37, at 150–52 (summarizing surveys on American adults’ views
on how much the federal government should spend).
73. For a good discussion of whether to prioritize government’s potentially positive effects as a
provider of public goods or its potentially negative effects on liberty, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN
& RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE
(1999).
74. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
75. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
2016] 1073QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING
covers goods with high and growing costs, such as health care, education, child
care, housing, and retirement income. There are different and overlapping
possible reasons why costs for these goods and services are high, and I review
them here.76 In particular, I discuss below the cost pressures from scarcity of
goods, an aging population, and low labor productivity growth, as well as the
particular constellation of cost issues around health care. The purpose of this is
not to provide a definitive answer for why, for example, health care is expen-
sive. Rather, the purpose is to say that, for at least one set of possible reasons,
the explanations are based on underlying economic forces that may be largely
beyond our control.
A. SCARCE GOODS
The simplest reason for high prices is that demand is growing faster than
supply. This is especially true, for example, with housing, at least in certain
regions where the desirable area to live has limits, physical or political, on
density. In such places, governments may intervene to keep some housing
affordable for low-income individuals, such as by owning public housing,
subsidizing (or mandating) low-income and affordable housing, providing tax
abatements to developers, requiring rent control and stabilization, and so on.
For those actions, like ownership and subsidization, that have a budgetary cost,
the cost is likely to be high and rising in high-cost areas. Indeed, because it is
precisely high costs that lead to government intervention, the two would tend to
go together.
That said, there may often be supply-side reforms that can bring down costs,
such as re-zoning to encourage greater density or development of highways and
mass transit to increase the desirable residential area. Thus, in some cases,
expanding public spending on the scarce good in question may not be the only
policy tool available. Nonetheless, supply-side reforms take time, and so in the
short term scarcity may drive up government budgets.
B. AN AGING POPULATION
Elderly people disproportionately rely on government spending and transfers,
whether in the form of Social Security, Medicare and other health care, disabil-
ity insurance, subsidized housing, or otherwise. Because of improvements in
health care, delayed childbirth, and other demographic shifts, the elderly make
up a growing share of the population in the United States and other developed
countries, and thus spending on these programs is likely to rise relative to other
parts of the economy. Furthermore, many elderly are outside of the labor force,
meaning they are not producing income that could correspondingly raise GDP;
their consumption of goods and services comes disproportionately from trans-
fers, rather than earned income.
76. See infra Sections II.A–D.
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Although there may be some policy responses to this, such as increased
immigration and pronatalist policies, there is likely little that we can do to stop
the trend in the near term. That means an increase in public spending as a share
of GDP even if we keep relative benefits fixed.77
C. LOW LABOR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
Because of a phenomenon sometimes called “Baumol’s cost disease,” goods
and services with low labor productivity growth often see their prices rise faster
than the average price growth in the economy. General economic theory holds
that labor productivity growth leads to wage growth because a given worker can
produce more, and therefore the value of the worker’s labor has gone up. But
this affects wages throughout the labor market, including in those industries that
have not seen comparable productivity growth.78 Although a company with
high productivity growth can afford to pay its workers more without raising
prices (and maybe even while lowering prices), a company with low productiv-
ity growth has to either raise prices or lower output (or, often, both).
The classic example from William Baumol and William Bowen is the perform-
ing arts. “The output per man-hour of the violinist playing a Schubert quartet in
a standard concert hall is relatively fixed, and it is fairly difficult to reduce the
number of actors necessary for a performance of Henry IV, Part II.”79 But
because real wages for actors have clearly risen since the sixteenth century, so
has the cost of seeing a Shakespeare play, which puts strain on performing arts
companies.80
Many government activities are also labor-intensive, such as teaching, polic-
ing, social work, sanitation, postal services, and care of the indigent. (Health
care is sometimes also on this list, though the dynamics of the health care
market are more complicated, as discussed below.)81 As such, government is
likely to be particularly burdened by the cost disease and see prices rise faster
77. See, e.g., BENEDICT CLEMENTS ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, THE FISCAL CONSEQUENCES OF
SHRINKING POPULATIONS 4 (2015), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk43345 [http://
perma.cc/3765-SQDX] (finding that “spending on age-related programs (pensions and health) . . . would
increase by 9 percentage points of GDP” without further reforms and that the “fiscal consequences [of
that increase] are potentially dire”).
78. See ROBERT B. ARCHIBALD & DAVID H. FELDMAN, WHY DOES COLLEGE COST SO MUCH? 36–37
(2011); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, THE COST DISEASE: WHY COMPUTERS GET CHEAPER AND HEALTH CARE
DOESN’T 21 (2012) (“In the long run, wages for all workers throughout a country’s economy tend to go
up and down together.”).
79. W. J. Baumol & W. G. Bowen, On the Performing Arts: The Anatomy of Their Economic
Problems, 55 AM. ECON. REV. 495, 500 (1965).
80. An anecdote: An opera director I know told me that to cover his opera company’s costs just from
ticket sales would require prices of $600 or more per ticket. In fact, only about 10% of the opera
company’s revenue came from ticket sales, with the rest from grants and endowment income (and
furthermore, the once-prominent company has since declared bankruptcy and closed).
81. See infra Section II.D.
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than average.82 To be clear, the cost disease is distinct from good scarcity. Here,
the concern is not that labor costs are high because of a lack of supply, as is
often the case with housing costs. Rather, the concern is that a given unit of
labor cannot produce enough to offset rising wages. That said, supply-and-
demand dynamics are central to the cost disease—for wages to rise with
productivity, the labor market must be somewhat competitive.
Importantly, the cost disease is not necessarily an economic problem, because
the lower prices in the high-productivity industries free up resources to pay the
higher prices in the low-productivity industries. We spend less on cars and
toasters, and more on police and teachers, and it all works out. But the cost
disease is a political problem if the public sector is disproportionately burdened
by it. In that case, public spending will naturally grow as a share of GDP, even
if the overall basket of goods does not change. As Baumol has said, this
phenomenon could create “a looming crisis for public choice” as the GDP share
of public spending grows ever-larger.83
D. HEALTH CARE
A major driver of recent and projected growth in government spending is
health care,84 and so it deserves special mention, even though it is really a
constellation of issues, including the three mentioned above. There is, of course,
much debate about the causes of cost growth in health care, and a huge set of
policies aimed at trying to slow growth or “bend the cost curve.” A handful of
the possible suspects behind high costs include: the increase in the number and
efficacy of treatments worth spending money on; labor intensity and cost
disease forces; end-of-life care; informational asymmetries and supply-driven
demand; rent-seeking by physicians, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies;
and medical malpractice compensation. Likely, there is a bit of each of these
factors at work but, to be clear, they are not all problems; some are features, not
bugs. For example, it is a good thing that there are ever more and better
treatments, and we should not see expanded spending for that reason as
inherently problematic. Similarly, high costs due to labor intensity are not a
problem to the extent that they are caused by productivity improvements
elsewhere in the economy.
Analyzing more fully the causes of health care spending growth is well
beyond the scope of this Article. For my purposes, it is enough to say that
82. This is not to say that any of these goods and services cannot see improvements in labor
productivity. There may be some amazing technology in the future to stop crime or pick up trash that
would make extensive labor in those areas much less necessary. Should that happen, the government
sector could eventually shrink as a share of GDP. But there are no signs of such technology as of this
writing.
83. William J. Baumol, Health Care, Education and the Cost Disease: A Looming Crisis for Public
Choice, 77 PUB. CHOICE 17, 17 (1993).
84. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2015 TO 2025, at 1 (2015),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49892 [http://perma.cc/FS5W-35JN].
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governments spend a lot on health care, and they are projected to spend even
more in the future.85
E. SUMMARY
Because of these (and other) factors, government spending has been growing
steadily for a long time. U.S. government spending has gone from less than
10% of GDP around 1910 to about 37% by 2007.86 Much of this comes from
the creation and expansion of social insurance programs like Medicare, Medic-
aid, and Social Security—and the centrality of health care, aging, and wage
growth to these programs is telling.
Barring huge productivity improvements or other changes, costs are likely to
stay high, and thus so will public spending—unless governments simply choose
to get out of the business of paying for these goods and services and push them
back onto the private sector. This Article is agnostic as to whether any particular
good ought to be purchased by the public or private sectors—that is ultimately a
political question. That said, two brief comments are worth making. First, the
standard set of goods for which governments pay all or much of the cost is
fairly consistent across the developed economies: health care, education, hous-
ing, policing, arts and culture, care of the indigent, social insurance, and so on.
There are likely good reasons why this is the case.
Second, the high costs described above are precisely one of those reasons for
public spending, when the good itself has some particular social value or
significance.87 If society wants wide provision of a cheap good, it may not need
to do much more than provide a private market. (Consider clothing, for ex-
ample.) But if the social good is expensive, low-income individuals may not be
85. See id.
86. See KENWORTHY, supra note 37, at 10, 11 fig.1.1, 82, 83 fig.4.5. The figures include federal, state,
and local government.
87. The questions of why a government or society might choose to publicly provide a good, and
whether it ought to, are deep and complex. This Article is agnostic as to whether any particular good
should be publicly provided and instead takes as a given that society has decided to and now must
answer the question of how to pay for it. But, importantly, the list of such goods should not be confined
to pure public goods, nor to those with high spillovers. These are the goods that standard public finance
imagines that governments will provide, see, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE
62–64, 75 (10th ed. 2014), but this is not a particularly helpful guide in practice. First, the list of pure,
nonexcludable, nonrivalrous public goods is small. Second, the existence of spillovers does not help,
because nearly all goods have some spillovers. See Peter O. Steiner, Public Expenditure Budgeting, in
THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC FINANCE 241, 247 (The Brookings Inst. 1974) (“Does any good which
produces an externality become a public good no matter how incidental the externality? Few goods do
not meet this test and thus this definition fails to provide guidance as to which goods ought to be
candidates for public provision . . . .”). In practice, societies publicly provide goods for a host of other
reasons that are not strictly related to simple economic models and instead reflect broad normative
conclusions. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 78 (4th ed. 1984) (discussing “merit goods,” which are simply those “which society (as
distinct from the preferences of the individual consumer) wishes to encourage” and thus subsidizes,
even though the goods may be rival or excludable and thus technically “private”); Steiner, supra, at 247
(“Collective goods arise whenever some segment of the public collectively wants and is prepared to pay
for a bundle of goods and services other than what the unhampered market will produce.”).
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able to afford the good, and even middle-income individuals may react ad-
versely to the good becoming a larger share of their budgets.88 And the more
expensive the good, the greater that effect.
The traditional choice, therefore, is either to accept an ever-larger public
sector or to simply not pay for the goods publicly—to privatize them (and thus
exacerbate the distributional problems) or simply stop providing them alto-
gether.89 Neither choice is pleasant. Quasi-public spending presents a third way,
where goods may still be supplied consistent with public goals and in a
progressive manner but are not as bounded by the political budget constraints
that arise in part from heuristics about the proper size of government.
III. QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING
When the government—for whatever reason—decides that a particular good
should be paid for publicly, it has a choice. The standard answer is that the
government should simply pay for the good, in whole or in part, raising the
revenue to do so in a progressive way through the tax system, thus ensuring
universal access and affordability. But the examples of the ACA and income-
driven student loan repayment provide an alternative. Instead of simply shifting
the spending on the good fully onto the government in order to pay for the good
collectively, the government can synthesize a similar allocational and distribu-
tional effect through a combination of direct payments from individuals to
providers and distributional adjustments from the government. This is what this
Article terms quasi-public spending.
In essence, quasi-public spending cuts out the government middleman as the
purchaser of a good and instead has individuals purchase the good directly in
such a way as to mimic the progressivity and universality of a direct public
spending program. An individual might be required or strongly encouraged to
purchase the good for a market price, but then the government provides
subsidies and limited taxes or other charges to shift the distributional burden of
paying for the good. Thus, the net cost to some individuals is similar to what
their net cost would be if the government simply raised taxes to pay for the
88. For example, if a household follows the flawed yet standard advice to follow a budget that
allocates spending across consumption categories, it may see cost growth in one category—such as
education or health care—as evidence of over-spending rather than changes in relative prices. Thus,
rather than accept that the high costs are affordable or worthwhile, they may instead seek to cut back
consumption of the good. How much this actually occurs is an empirical question, of course.
89. Full privatization could, in theory, be accompanied by a greater focus on redistribution through
the tax system so as to make sure that individuals have sufficient income to afford the private market
prices. This is another way of stating the general view of welfare economics that cash transfers produce
higher welfare than in-kind transfers. Although that may be theoretically true, the political constraints
on increasing redistribution through the tax system are real. Furthermore, as Baumol points out, the cost
pressures discussed above do not disappear and thus could create a different sort of political problem as
individuals directly face the rising prices. See Baumol, supra note 83, at 26–27. Politicians could be
pressured to respond with other measures, like price caps, which would just recreate some of the same
problems. Id. Thus, privatization carries significant risks.
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good directly. The difference is that much of that cost takes the form of a price
rather than a tax, and thus much of the total spending for the good occurs off the
government’s budget.
A. ELEMENTS OF QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING
A direct tax-funded public spending program requires a relatively simple
financing structure—simply raise revenue from taxes and then use that revenue
to pay for a good. To get a similar effect from quasi-public spending, however,
requires using a more complex basket of policy instruments. In particular, it
requires some combination of mandates (or other encouragement), subsidies
(with perhaps some direct government activity in the form of smaller scale
backstopping and taxes), and regulation. I discuss the role of each below. I
should note, however, that I don’t claim any particular novelty in listing these as
features of government programs—indeed, they describe huge portions of
government economic intervention. The novelty is rather in the particular
combination of them to synthesize an effect similar to direct public spending.
1. Mandates
A mandate plays two roles. First, it mimics the mandatory nature of the tax
system. Rather than using the tax law to force everyone to make a payment to
the government, which is then used to purchase the good, the government could
instead require everyone to purchase the good directly, simply cutting out the
government middleman. Second, a mandate ensures widespread adoption of the
good, similar to government provision. Thus, mandates are particularly appropri-
ate for goods that ought to be universally or near-universally consumed, such as
health care and K–12 education. In Richard Musgrave’s classic formulation, the
mandate mimics the Allocation Branch of government—it is what provides the
good.90
Mandates raise important liberty concerns, however, and have proven to be
politically and legally difficult (though not impossible) to implement.91 The set
of goods that could politically tolerate a mandate may be relatively small.92 But
one could take a carrot, rather than stick, approach, through the use of subsidies
and other forms of encouragement.93 Economically, subsidies and mandates
may not be that different,94 but using subsidies to drive uptake complicates their
90. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC ECONOMY 6
(1959).
91. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
92. Some mandates may be “social” in the sense that society mandates the purchase of the good,
even if government does not. For example, this is somewhat the case for higher education, which acts
as a gateway to particular jobs and professions. See supra Section I.B.
93. Note, however, that mandates have varying degrees of force behind them—from mere disap-
proval up to criminal sanctions. Thus, at the margin, the difference between a weak mandate and
another form of encouragement may be slight.
94. As frequently noted during debates around the ACA, we could get the same effect as the penalty
if we instead raised everyone’s taxes but then provided a credit equal to the penalty for those who
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role in a quasi-public spending program and also the relationship between the
quasi-public program and the central public finance system.
First, as discussed below, subsidies are more directly used for altering the
distributional effects of the spending.95 If the subsidy is also playing an
allocative role, by encouraging uptake, the subsidy design question becomes
substantially more complex. Second, if the subsidy is being used to make the
product somewhat cheaper for everyone, not merely those who cannot afford to
pay a market price, then the quasi-public spending program would need to have
some net support from the central public finance system and general tax
revenue. The argument that penalties and subsidies are economically equivalent
requires some offsetting increase in taxes,96 so it is not surprising that general
taxes would need to go up in this case—but that would mute somewhat the
effect of keeping the program off-budget.
2. Subsidies and Taxes
Subsidizing (at the low end) and taxing or levying other charges (at the high
end) would mimic Musgrave’s Distribution Branch of government.97 It would
allow the relative burdens of paying for the good to be distributed in a
progressive way, as if the good were financed using general revenue. This is
particularly important for services that suffer from high costs, because the
problem is precisely that many people cannot afford to pay the true cost of the
service, even if the average person could. This sort of a structure should
distinguish quasi-public spending from a typical voucher-type program where
the voucher or subsidy is a fixed lump-sum amount.
Subsidies cost money, of course, and in the absence of any additional taxes,
that money would presumably come from general revenues. But the quasi-
purchased health insurance. The credit would appear as a subsidy, but the end result would be the
same—those who did not purchase health insurance would pay an additional net amount to the
government. Prior to NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, there was some doubt about whether the ACA individual
mandate was constitutional. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Indi-
vidual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010). But there
was never any doubt that an economically equivalent system of simply raising everyone’s taxes, and
then providing a credit for those who purchased insurance, would have been constitutional. See, e.g.,
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). Subsidies and mandates
can, however, differ in terms of their abilities to achieve optimal social outcomes in the regulatory
context, but the literature on Pigouvian price instruments versus quantity regulation is beyond the scope
of this Article. See, e.g., Brian Galle, Tax, Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92
TEX. L. REV. 837, 843–47 (2014); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective
Taxes to Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 4 (2002).
95. See infra Section III.A.2.
96. See supra note 94.
97. MUSGRAVE, supra note 90, at 17. The split is not quite this simple, however. The Allocation
Branch may still use progressive financing if, for example, the benefits of the good rise with income.
See id. at 9–12. To the degree that the distributional adjustments in quasi-public spending are actually
an attempt to measure benefit, then the adjustments would still be a part of Musgrave’s Allocation
Branch. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 272–74 (analyzing the benefits that flow from income-driven
repayment).
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public spending program could also include limited taxes in order to raise
revenue and increase the progressivity of the distributional aspects of the
program. Thus, the ACA includes the Medicare surtax and the tax on net
investment income,98 and I have suggested that a higher rate of interest on
student debt could play a similar role with respect to higher education fund-
ing.99 That said, there is some interplay with the role of the mandate discussed
above. If the purchase of the good is mandated, then a tax at the high end of the
distribution could be implemented without adverse selection problems; that is
less likely to be possible where the program relies on subsidies or other
encouragement to drive voluntary uptake.
In some cases, a government backstop might be necessary to provide the
good or service directly in cases where the private market would continue to fail
to do so even under a quasi-public model, especially at the low end. We see this,
for example, with Medicaid. However, the backstop is essentially a 100%
subsidy, so it is still not necessary that the government become the direct
provider of the backstop—indeed, at least six states have been permitted to use
Medicaid subsidies under the ACA to pay for private health insurance plans.100
These subsidies and taxes would have a direct governmental budget effect,
and so a quasi-public spending program may not be completely off-budget. But
the budget effects are much smaller than if the good or service were provided
directly. Furthermore, they would, in theory, reflect only the distributional
element of the program, not the allocative provisioning of the good.
3. Regulation
If the government provided or directly purchased the good or service, it could
decide what features it would have. If the good or service is nominally provided
by the private sector, however, the government would likely need to use
regulation in order to ensure that the contours of the good or service line up
with public objectives. Otherwise, the quasi-public spending program could turn
into privatization with a heavy dose of rent-seeking. For example, mandating
the purchase of a good without some regulation of the content and pricing of the
98. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
99. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 279–81.
100. See MARYBETH MUSUMECI & ROBIN RUDOWITZ, THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, THE ACA AND MEDICAID EXPANSION WAIVERS 1 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-
brief-the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers [http://perma.cc/QB99-KU4J]; JANE B. WISHNER ET AL.,
URBAN INST., MEDICAID EXPANSION, THE PRIVATE OPTION, AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS: THE
USE OF SECTION 1115 WAIVERS TO IMPLEMENT MEDICAID EXPANSION UNDER THE ACA 2 (2015), http://www.
urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000235-Medicaid-Expansion-The-Private-
Option-and-Personal-Responsibility-Requirements.pdf [http://perma.cc/59SM-J6BY]. The idea of using
Medicaid funding to purchase private insurance is not new. See Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D.
Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health Insurance—The Great New Experiment?, 369 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 7, 8 (2013) (“Since 1965, Medicaid has authorized the secretary of health and human
services to use federal funds to pay insurance premiums in states that elect such an approach.”).
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good would be counterproductive.101 Hence, the ACA includes rules such as
requiring group-rated insurance premiums and forbidding denial of coverage
based on pre-existing conditions.102 The government also uses its authority
under Title IV of the Higher Education Act to monitor the schools receiving
federal student loan funds.103
B. DISTINGUISHING QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING FROM SIMILAR PROGRAMS
There are many gray areas in trying to describe different types of government
intervention in the economy, and this Article does not aim to provide a bright-
line definition of what is and is not a quasi-public spending program. Further-
more, even programs close to the public end of the public-private continuum
will have varying degrees of public-ness. As an example, consider that the
health insurance system mandates purchase of health insurance, either by
individuals or employers, while there is no similar governmental mandate
operating for income-driven student loan repayment. To aid in clarifying the
prior discussion of what sorts of situations should be considered quasi-public
spending, I now distinguish quasi-public spending from similar forms of govern-
ment action.
Because quasi-public spending is ultimately about the financing of the good,
and not who provides the good, it should be distinguished from private contract-
ing. Hiring private security contractors to replace soldiers or a private company
to operate a prison does not change the fact that the government pays for the
good or service out of tax revenue. Furthermore, a quasi-public spending
program could involve exclusively public agencies—for example, federal stu-
dent loan-financed tuition spending at public universities. The focus is not on
whether the provider of the good or service is a private entity or a public
agency, but rather on whether the payment is made via traditional government
or not.
Quasi-public spending also does not encompass all government subsidization
of private spending. The government subsidizes many things, including food,
housing, charitable spending, transportation, and finance, for public policy
reasons. The simplest explanation for these subsidies (other than rent-seeking)
is that they are (roughly) Pigouvian subsidies to account for positive externali-
ties.104 Thus, the government is simply altering the private market price in order
101. Otherwise, there is no oversight of what the individuals are actually buying and whether it
serves the policy’s goals. And the mandate to purchase the good would increase the ability of providers
to extract rents in the absence of any price regulation.
102. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg–300gg-9 (2012).
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (2012). For example, institutions that use Title IV funds must provide
employment statistics, § 1094(a)(8), and cannot offer incentive compensation based on enrollments to
employees engaged in recruiting students or awarding financial aid, § 1094(a)(20).
104. In cases where there is some public externality (positive or negative) from a good, the market
would likely overproduce (for a negative externality) or underproduce (for a positive externality) the
good because the market price would not be taking into account that externality. A Pigouvian tax (or
subsidy) adds to (or subtracts from) the market price the marginal social cost (or benefit) of the good
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to aid markets in reaching the efficient outcome. Quasi-public spending, by
contrast, is a tool for public spending on goods. Quasi-public spending can also
be distinguished from simple subsidies by the size and scope of the program in
relation to the good. For example, housing and agricultural subsidies are
important government programs, but they do not dominate their spaces in the
same way that government-subsidized health insurance and federal student
loans dominate their respective spaces.105 That said, there is a continuum for
these programs and a lot of gray area. The shift from private spending to
quasi-public spending for health care and higher education, for example, has
been gradual and incremental over time.
IV. COMPARING QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING AND DIRECT PUBLIC SPENDING
The examination of health insurance and higher education financing in Part I
and the analysis in Part III on the component pieces of quasi-public spending
lead to several observations about the key differences between quasi-public
spending and direct public spending. This Part explores these differences in
detail in order to better understand the nature of the policy tool and under what
circumstances (if any) it will operate well.
In this Part, I focus in particular on how quasi-public spending will generally
be off-budget—because it involves direct payments from individuals to
providers—and more complex than other forms of spending. These are both
often treated as strikes against this sort of “hidden” spending,106 but here I argue
that the case is not so simple and that there can be advantages to both features
given the constraints under which policymakers operate. Furthermore, quasi-
public spending also offers the ability to take advantage of existing markets and
institutions and provides more design flexibility to policymakers. These are, in
essence, the flip sides of the first two features but cut more strongly in favor of
quasi-public spending. For these reasons, I argue that quasi-public spending
should be a serious part of a policymaker’s tool kit—in some situations, a
quasi-public solution may be the best policy.
that would not otherwise be in the market price, and thus would shift output closer to the social
optimum. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 87, at 84–87.
105. Nearly all health care is purchased with insurance, and all health insurance is subsidized in one
way or another, most prominently through the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance from
gross income for tax purposes. See supra note 32. Similarly, for the 2011–2012 academic year, 64.3%
of students had received a federal student loan. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS tbl.331.95 (2014), https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_331.95.asp [https://
perma.cc/7M8N-YQ7J] (showing the “[p]ercentage of undergraduate students ages 18 to 24 in their 4th
(senior) year or above who ever received federal loans, nonfederal loans, or Parent Loans for
Undergraduate Students (PLUS), and average cumulative amount borrowed, by selected student
characteristics and control and level of institution: 1989–90, 1999–2000, and 2011–12”). The role of the
government in housing and agriculture is not nearly as ubiquitous.
106. See supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text.
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A. OFF-BUDGET SPENDING
By using direct payments from recipients to providers, a quasi-public spend-
ing program can operate largely off-budget, meaning that it may not raise the
nominal size of the public sector. This is true even though direct payments from
individuals to providers may be mandated in the same way as tax payments, and
the net payments may be income-based and progressive in the same way as tax
payments. This is the most obvious and most important difference between
quasi-public spending and direct public spending, and it implicates several
different issues.
1. Exceeding Budget Constraints
As discussed in Part II, the nominal size of the public sector likely acts as a
constraint on public spending independent of the basis for spending (or not) on
any particular program, and recent history implies that we are currently operat-
ing at or near that political ceiling. That two of our most recent large public
spending programs—the ACA and income-driven student loan repayment—
both operate in a quasi-public way shows that keeping public spending off-
budget may be the most feasible way to enact such spending.
In some cases, policymakers may be reasonably and justifiably concluding
that this political budget constraint should not be a barrier to enacting policy.
But in describing such constraints as “political” or “artificial,” I do not mean
that they are not important or reflective of serious policy conclusions. The
constraints may not represent how many resources an economy has to purchase
goods and services collectively, but they do roughly represent broad conclusions
about the role of government, the public/private divide, public choice, and so
on. For example, many Americans object on surveys to “big government,” but
there is much less objection to specific programs, even when individuals are
called upon to pay for them.107 Thus, the big-government objection may be
more about fears of an overly powerful state than it is about social programs per
se, even collective ones. I discuss these factors in more detail in the next
section, but I also mention them here to emphasize that being able to exceed
these budget constraints does not come without a cost.
The tax-expenditure literature has faced a similar debate between, on the one
hand, those who believe that a transparent and procedurally fair budget appropria-
tions process should be paramount and that policymakers should be forced to
make choices among different forms of spending on the same footing, and, on
the other hand, those who believe that, if the choice is between a tax expendi-
ture and no expenditure at all, the tax expenditure wins.108 The difference with
quasi-public spending is that we have a tax-expenditure budget, but we do not
107. See KENWORTHY, supra note 37, at 150–52; MICHELMORE, supra note 27, at 2 (citing survey
data).
108. Compare Burman & Phaup, supra note 33, with John L. Buckley, Tax Expenditure Reform:
Some Common Misconceptions, 132 TAX NOTES 255 (2011).
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have an equivalent quasi-public spending budget. Although some elements of
quasi-public spending, such as government subsidies, might appear on a tax-
expenditure budget—or even on the primary budget—the direct payments from
individuals to providers (such as health insurance premiums and loan-financed
tuition payments) do not.
Quasi-public spending is thus particularly opaque, at least as a budgetary
matter. As I discuss in the next section, there can be some offsetting clarity, but
off-budget spending nonetheless may carry significant risks that stem from a
lack of budgetary oversight. This is especially important because, as discussed
below, the characterization of payments as something other than taxes does not
immunize them from having the distortionary effects of tax payments. But it
will be particularly hard for analysts to study those effects without a firm grasp
on the magnitude of the payments themselves.
2. Fiscal Illusion(s)
The above point—that the off-budget nature of much quasi-public spending
is particularly relevant in a world of high public spending and political budget
constraints—is an application of the broader point that quasi-public spending
involves a degree of fiscal illusion.109 The central point of this Article’s analysis
is that a price paid for a good by an individual to a provider ought to be
considered equivalent to a tax under certain circumstances. But that fact will be
invisible to a large number of people. Thus, government is, in some cases,
deliberately obfuscating the true nature of the program.
But there are other types of fiscal illusion that may cut the other way. Caring
about the nominal size of government is itself a form of fiscal illusion. If
government disproportionately pays for goods with high-price growth, it will
appear to be getting bigger and bigger, even though the overall bundle of goods
may not change.110 Furthermore, much of government spending is social insur-
ance and thus is simply responding to other cyclical economic effects. For
example, government spending increases in a recession because of automatic
stabilizers built into Unemployment Insurance, Social Security, Medicaid, and
other programs, and private spending decreases because of demand shocks or
job losses, but this tells us little about whether government is crowding out
individuals’ economic activity or liberty.
109. The literature on fiscal illusion discusses the ways in which the institutional structures of public
finance can affect taxpayers’ perceptions of the manner and cost of funding government and their
corresponding view of the size of government. See, e.g., Wallace E. Oates, On the Nature and
Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey, in TAXATION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
RUSSELL MATHEWS 65 (Geoffrey Brennan et al. eds., 1988) (defining fiscal illusion as “the notion that the
systematic misperception of key fiscal parameters may significantly distort fiscal choices by the
electorate”); Richard E. Wagner, Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice, 25 PUB.
CHOICE 45 (1976).
110. See supra Part II.
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How these two illusions interact will vary depending on the details of the
program. In the case of health care, the ACA drafters, according to Gruber,
cared deeply about hiding the nature of the mandated insurance premium
payments.111 But other aspects of the ACA had clear budgetary and political
effects, and the experience of the Clinton reform plan showed that the fiscal
illusion around the size of government was a powerful force against reform.112
So this may be a case in which using one illusion against another was justified—
though time will tell.
On the other hand, income-driven student loan repayment is almost entirely
off-budget, and although students surely know that the federal government is
the lender (and the government does do relatively detailed accounting of its loan
programs),113 students are likely a long way from seeing the repayment of the
loan as equivalent to a graduate surtax. Even with income-driven repayment,
many otherwise well-informed commentators and policymakers continue to
treat the nominal size of a student’s debt as a central policy concern, even
though the payments are by definition affordable and students may never have
to pay back a good portion of the loan.114 Should PAYE become more widely
adopted, greater understanding may evolve, but we currently seem to be a long
way away. In this case the illusions about the nature of income-driven repay-
ment may actually be impeding informed discussion about student loans and
higher education finance.
3. Budget Scoring and Procedure
In addition to the political and optical effects of spending off-budget, there
are also specific structural and procedural hurdles that relate directly to the
Congressional scoring of a bill—the measurement of its costs to government.115
For example, the reconciliation process in Congress, which provides a smoother
process for passage of budget bills, can, under the so-called Byrd Rule, only be
used in situations that do not increase the deficit for fiscal years outside of the
period covered by the reconciliation bill.116 Keeping the direct government
outlays related to the program smaller can therefore make reconciliation—and
thus passage—more likely, leaving aside any of the political optics.
111. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR
2016, at 370–87 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/edu.
pdf [http://perma.cc/M5X9-2UYY].
114. See, e.g., Sam Frizell, Lawmakers in Ten States Push for Debt-Free College, TIME (Dec. 7,
2015), http://time.com/4137427/lawmakers-in-ten-states-push-for-debt-free-college/ [http://perma.cc/CJ
7W-8SDT]; Michael Stratford, Debt-Free Plans, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 19, 2015), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2015/06/19/what-people-are-saying-about-debt-free [http://perma.cc/Y94E-
BQSS] (describing policy proposals from Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton, Elizabeth Warren, and
others).
115. See supra note 9.
116. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 313, 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2012).
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As an example of both the political and structural hurdles related to the
nominal size of a program, consider the 1993 Clinton health care plan. Like the
ACA, the plan included a mandate that individuals buy health insurance.117
However, unlike the Obamacare exchanges, which act as marketplaces for
private insurance, the Clinton proposal would have established regional health
alliances that would have directly collected the premium payments and then
distributed them to providers.118 Because of that more direct role for the
alliances, CBO ruled that the alliances were not private entities, but agents of
the government, and therefore that payments to the alliances would be consid-
ered federal receipts (though not technically taxes).119
As a result of that ruling, spending on health care under the Clinton plan
would have become part of the nominal public sector, which would have caused
a 20% increase in nominal government outlays.120 That created a formidable
political obstacle.121 Moreover, the proposal then became subject to the more
difficult procedural rules under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974.122 The
health care plan died shortly thereafter.
This was not necessarily CBO’s preferred outcome, however, and it went out
of its way to help the drafters of the ACA avoid a similar fate. In 2009, it issued
a detailed report on its methodology in determining the budget impact of health
care reform, which was effectively a map for the bill drafters to avoid the same
budget treatment as the Clinton plan.123 That said, it is not obvious in principle
that the costs should be off-budget. CBO’s reasoning in 1994 was that:
[W]hen the federal government specifies not only an outcome but also how
the outcome is to be achieved, limits the ways in which the activity can be
financed, makes a substantial financial contribution, and calls for the creation
117. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 2–3.
118. See id. at 18–21. Large employers could have set up their own corporate alliances, but most
spending would have run through an alliance of one sort or another. Id.
119. Id. at 44–49.
120. Id. at 50 tbl. 3-1.
121. See, e.g., John Fairhall & Karen Hosler, CBO Report Unleashes New Pressure to Scale Back
Clinton Health Care Plan, BALT. SUN (Feb. 9, 1994), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-02-09/news/
1994040025_1_budget-office-plan-clinton-health [http://perma.cc/M5GZ-222R].
122. The Clinton Administration had hoped to use budget reconciliation, much like the Obama
Administration would later do for the ACA, to pass the 1993 health care proposal, but Senator Robert
Byrd opposed this as stories began to emerge about its potential high costs. See, e.g., Paul Starr, The
Hillarycare Mythology, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 13, 2007), http://prospect.org/article/hillarycare-
mythology [http://perma.cc/4FGN-TL3X]. Reconciliation would have been possible in part because the
administration estimated that the bill actually lowered the deficit. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note
13, at 35–36. Under CBO’s methodology, however, the deficit would have increased by $74 billion over
the next six years. Id. This effectively put reconciliation off the table and required that any bill would
have to follow regular order and thus be subject to a potential Senate filibuster. See supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
123. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT OF PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE NATION’S
HEALTH INSURANCE SYSTEM (2009), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-congress-2009-2010/
reports/05-27-healthinsuranceproposals.pdf [http://perma.cc/4RLE-LMZH].
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of new institutions to carry out the activity, CBO concludes that the boundar-
ies of regulation have been crossed.124
CBO partly reiterated this view in its 2009 report, stating that, with regard to
mandated insurance purchases:
[T]he key consideration is whether the proposal would be making health
insurance an essentially governmental program, tightly controlled by the
federal government with little choice available to those who offer and buy
health insurance—or whether the system would provide significant flexibility
in terms of the types, prices, and number of private-sector sellers of insurance
available to people.125
CBO’s test gave the ACA bill drafters a way out because the test focused on
the degree of control by the government and the degree of choice and flexibility
for consumers. These are certainly important considerations in policy design,
but note that they do not relate to the method of financing the purchase of the
good, which is the central focus of this Article. One could imagine a program
involving the same institutional landscape and the same degree of consumer
choice but where consumers paid for health care with taxes rather than prices.
For example, suppose each person were given a voucher that was income-based
to help purchase health insurance from exchanges. Suppose furthermore that the
money to pay for the vouchers was raised from income taxes, such that the net
cost for each person would be the same as under the ACA. There is no question
that CBO would have scored those as “taxes” and the spending on vouchers as
“spending.” Thus, it seems that the degree of control and choice, although
important from a public choice standpoint, is not in fact determinative of
whether spending should be considered public or not. But because control and
choice were CBO’s touchstones, the ACA drafters could create a program that
effectively operated like public spending without causing much of that spending
to be scored as government revenue.
B. COMPLEXITY AND OPACITY
As discussed above, the design of a quasi-public spending program necessar-
ily involves using a basket of policy instruments to achieve a similar result as
simple tax-and-spend.126 Quasi-public spending will thus naturally tend to be a
more complex system. Furthermore, the off-budget nature of quasi-public spend-
ing generates one form of opacity—namely, disguising what are essentially
tax-like payments for a good as prices.
124. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 46.
125. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 123, at 4.
126. See supra Section III.A.
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It has not gone unnoticed that government programs have increasingly taken
on this sort of hidden structure. Scholars on the left and right have criticized the
complexity and opacity that sometimes accompany such programs. On the left,
some scholars complain that involving private actors and making the govern-
ment role indirect could lead to a disconnect between the role of the programs
and the role of government in general.127 (We might call this the “keep
government’s hands off my Medicare”128 problem.) Similarly, left-leaning schol-
ars worry that opacity and the involvement of private actors could lead to
rent-seeking and upward redistribution. Consider the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, the benefits of which skew toward wealthy homeowners and their banks,
or how certain privatization programs essentially redistribute tax money from
the beneficiaries of the program to the shareholders of the government contrac-
tor providing the program.129
On the right, scholars are also concerned about the inefficiencies that accom-
pany complexity and collective provision, but more because keeping such bloat
off-budget makes the government look leaner than it really is and allows for a
silently expanding state.130 They also worry about behavioral distortions by the
beneficiaries of the subsidies and other programs in addition to the providers.131
These are all serious and important concerns that policymakers should con-
sider. However, I also think that the issue is more nuanced than prior commen-
tary paints it. For the reasons that follow, I believe that the complexity of
quasi-public spending should not necessarily disqualify it as a reasonable policy
choice.
1. Direct Public Spending Can Also Be Complex
Although a quasi-public spending program may tend to be more complex,
complexity is certainly not a necessary result. It is perfectly possible, in theory,
to design a quasi-public program that is relatively simple and clear, at least to
the general public.132 Imagine, for example, that instead of the ACA’s complex
system of state-based health care exchanges, the federal government simply
chartered a single insurance company that charged income-based premiums.133
127. See, e.g., HACKER, supra note 21; METTLER, supra note 19; MORGAN & CAMPBELL, supra note 20.
128. See Paul Krugman, Health Care Realities, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/07/31/opinion/31krugman.html [https://perma.cc/3NF5-HCG7] (discussing how an attendee at a
town hall meeting during the health care debates told Representative Bob Inglis to “keep your
government hands off my Medicare”).
129. See METTLER, supra note 19, at 18.
130. See, e.g., Teles, supra note 24, at 102.
131. Id. at 105–06.
132. A straightforward program may still require some serious legal and technical expertise to
operate effectively, even if the effects of the program are clear.
133. Below I discuss how quasi-public spending tends to work with existing institutions rather than
replace them. See infra Section IV.C. This stylized proposal would, of course, replace existing
insurance companies and upend a lot of the medical finance system. That may be a major reason why it
was not pursued. However, it would not necessarily upend the health care delivery system—hospitals,
medical practices, etc., would still exist as before.
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Similarly, there is no guarantee that direct public programs will be simple.
The Tax Code alone is a good place to start to see the complexity that can be
associated with direct government activity. Alternatively, consider the complexi-
ties of administrative procedure and rulemaking, or the Pentagon’s budget. Lane
Kenworthy argues that complexity is actually a result of our structure of
government, with multiple veto points and layers of government.134 If so, it may
be that we are stuck with complexity regardless of whether we choose the
public or quasi-public path.
Furthermore, many of the complaints about complexity are focused on its
effects rather than complexity in and of itself. For example, Suzanne Mettler
describes the pre-2010 student loan program as a prime example of what
she calls the “submerged state.”135 Students received loans nominally from
private lenders without understanding that the loans would likely be more
expensive without government guarantees, while the lenders also extracted
many of those benefits for themselves.136 She thus described the end of subsi-
dies and the expansion of federal direct loans as a “victory” and a “claw back
[of] a significant portion of the submerged state.”137 However, in my view, this
same legislation actually made the student loan program more of a quasi-public
spending program, by expanding income-driven repayment.138 Thus, it is not
the quasi-public structure itself that forms the basis of this type of objection, but
rather the hidden rent-seeking.
That said, one way to make any social program simpler is to make the
benefits more universal and less dependent on income.139 Much of the adminis-
trative work in social programs comes in means-testing—consider the difficul-
ties associated with rolling out the health care exchanges in 2013,140 or the high
rate of Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) audits.141 If instead the benefits were
universal, regardless of income, much of this work would be unnecessary.
134. See KENWORTHY, supra note 37, at 109.
135. See generally METTLER, supra note 19.
136. See id. at 9–11.
137. Id. at 86.
138. IBR was greatly expanded by the same bill, but Mettler does not mention IBR in her discussion
of the bill and its effects.
139. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING AMERICAN SOCIAL
INSURANCE 38–41 (1999) (discussing universalism in social insurance).
140. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, For Some Shoppers, Buying Obamacare Is Turning into a Marathon,
WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/10/04/for-some-
shoppers-buying-obamacare-is-turning-into-a-marathon/ [https://perma.LBJ4-T9R4]; Robert Pear, Sha-
ron LaFraniere & Ian Austen, From the Start, Signs of Trouble at Health Portal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/us/politics/from-the-start-signs-of-trouble-at-health-portal.
html [https://perma.cc/X2E9-RFZ7].
141. The IRS estimates that the improper payments rate as a percentage of total payments was
21–25% in 2012. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE WAS NOT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND RECOVERY ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 5 (2013). The audit rate for individual tax returns claiming the EITC is about
twice the rate for all individual tax returns. See STEVEN T. MILLER ET AL., IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE DATA BOOK 2012, at 22 (2013).
1090 [Vol. 104:1057THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
Social Security is a prime example, with its universal benefit and its low
administrative costs.142 Although the Social Security benefit formula is progres-
sive,143 everyone gets a benefit, and it is simply a function of past wages rather
than current income, so there is little need for individual oversight. Some have
suggested a similar approach for higher education funding,144 though others say
the benefits from a more paternalistic approach are often worth the costs.145
A fuller discussion of the relative benefits of universal versus means-tested
programs is beyond the scope of this Article.146 However, it is worth noting that
universal does not mean regressive; a system can still be progressive—that is,
have higher costs, lower benefits, or both as a percentage of income as income
rises—even while providing a uniform benefit to everyone. This is because,
first, the benefit will still decrease as a share of income as income rises,147 and
second, revenue for the program can still be disproportionately raised from
those with higher income.148 However, to add more progressivity beyond that
would require limiting the benefits received by high-income individuals.149
2. Opacity and Clarity
There is, however, another dimension to complexity, which we might call
second-order complexity or opacity.150 For example, everyone knows that the
Tax Code and the Pentagon’s budget are aspects of government and that they
are complex. But quasi-public spending programs may be so opaque as to not
even appear to be government programs and thus could lead people to misunder-
stand the role of government in their lives. This leads to my second response: in
some circumstances, having a more direct connection between the good and the
payment could actually increase awareness, understanding, and civic engage-
ment, at least with respect to the program in question. When all taxes seem to
go into a giant pool, and when the complexities of government make it hard to
identify the individual benefits flowing from that pool, taxpayers may become
more cynical. It is easy to fall into the fallacy of believing that people can be
142. Social Security administrative expenses have been equal to or less than 1% of total expendi-
tures from the combined OASI and DI trust funds in every year from 1989 to 2012. See Social Security
Administrative Expenses, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/admin.html [http://
perma.cc/W44H-LJUH] (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).
143. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A) (2012) (calculating primary insurance amount as a decreasing
percentage of average indexed monthly earnings).
144. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD & FELDMAN, supra note 78, at 215.
145. See, e.g., KENWORTHY, supra note 37, at 145–46.
146. For a fuller discussion, see, for example, GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 139.
147. A flat-amount benefit becomes a smaller fraction of income as income rises.
148. See KENWORTHY, supra note 37, at 80.
149. See, e.g., Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Tasks, in PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC CHOICE: TWO
CONTRASTING VISIONS OF THE STATE, supra note 73, at 72, 79.
150. This is similar to the distinction between transactional complexity and rule complexity. See
John R. Brooks, Doing Too Much: The Standard Deduction and the Conflict Between Progressivity and
Simplification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203, 237–38 (2011). I am grateful to Larry Solum for this suggestion.
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categorized as “makers” and “takers,” or “taxpayers” and “tax eaters,”151 when
the benefits of government are so diffuse.
In contrast, when taxpayers can identify the benefits that flow from the
payment, they may become more invested in the program itself and supportive
of the funding structure. For example, this was the explicit purpose of keeping
Social Security separate from general revenues and funding it with a dedicated
tax.152 By clearly tying the retirement benefit to the taxation structure, Social
Security has achieved an impressive level of political strength (though almost
no one actually understands the complex benefit formula).
On the other hand, highlighting the redistributive element, rather than the
benefit element, in a quasi-public spending program may have a different sort of
effect on civic engagement, at least with respect to that good. Health care and
higher education, for example, are sometimes mythologized as being individual-
ist enterprises—fee-for-service, in effect—when in fact they have long been loci
of collective activity, with heavy government subsidization and regulation.
Thus, paying back a student loan—even a public, subsidized one—may appear
to be a mere contractual payment from one party to another (despite the active
involvement of government in facilitating and subsidizing that transaction). But
introducing a progressive income-driven element, as the PAYE program has,
makes it appear more tax-like. And paying a tax is more clearly a collective
enterprise—“buying civilization,” as it were.153
These two features—a direct connection to individual benefit and a broader
connection to social benefit—are somewhat in tension. Too tight a connection to
individual benefit reduces the ability to manage distribution, whereas too much
redistribution decouples the connection between the payment and the benefit. A
person calling on the government to keep its hands off his Medicare is probably
not saying, literally, that Medicare is not government; rather, the person likely is
using “government” to mean redistribution to someone else.154 Balancing these
competing effects will be a challenge to policymakers making use of quasi-
public spending.
3. Choice, Liberty, and Subsidiarity
For those on the right who fear a silently expanding state without pushback
from voters, the complexity of a quasi-public spending program may be offset
by more diffusion of power than under a direct public spending program.
Concerns about bureaucratic overreach by imperial agencies are lessened if the
money being spent goes directly to the provider of a good rather than being
151. See MICHELMORE, supra note 27, at 38–46.
152. See, e.g., id. at 5–6.
153. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is said to have stated: “I like to pay taxes. With them I buy
civilization.” See FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 71 (2d ed. 1961);
see also Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government
Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 179 (2013).
154. This ties in with my discussion on the distortionary effects of taxation. See infra Section IV.D.
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funneled through an agency’s budget. Thus, for example, we have many private
health insurance companies competing on exchanges rather than a single govern-
ment health service and a robust market of both public and private institutions
of higher education rather than a centralized education agency.155
Some have argued that the mandates involved in the ACA are an intrusion on
liberty,156 but it is likely far less of an intrusion than nationalization of the entire
health care sector would be. Indeed, the first major proposal for ACA-style
mandated health insurance, in 1991, made precisely this point—that such a
program would avoid the dangers of a “monolithic, government-run system”
that would “make matters worse,” while still providing for progressive prices in
order to address the distributional problems of price growth.157
Above, I criticized CBO’s methodology in scoring the ACA for focusing on
issues of government control and consumer choice rather than financing.158 But,
as I stated there, power and choice are still extremely important in policy
design, and in some cases quasi-public spending may allow for somewhat less
centralized government power and somewhat more consumer choice—particu-
larly if policymakers are following CBO’s methodology to avoid a budget
score.
Thus, although a strictly mandated program involving purchase of highly
regulated goods from entities with heavy government oversight may be indistin-
guishable from direct public spending, the more likely scenario is like the
American landscape for health care and higher education—a vast number of
entities, public and private, providing a differentiated set of goods at prices that
are at least somewhat market-based, and, ultimately, with at least some ability
for individuals to opt out (even if at a cost). Quasi-public spending therefore has
the potential to preserve a degree of individual choice, localism, and subsidiar-
ity,159 at least as compared to direct public spending.160
That said, a different landscape of providers could lead to a different conclu-
sion. Arguably, concentration of wealth and power in large corporate form is
155. Cf. Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of
Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1, 7 (2002) (“[T]he [charitable] deduction allows individuals to direct
federal funds, as opposed to leaving the choice up to the majority of the Congress, whose support might
be accompanied by an increase in government supervision.”).
156. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 94, at 605 (arguing that the government forcing individuals to
spend money with a private company is more constitutionally suspect than simply taxing them).
157. Mark V. Pauly et al., A Plan for ‘Responsible National Health Insurance,’ 10 HEALTH AFF. 5, 6,
8 (1991).
158. See supra Section IV.A.3.
159. By “subsidiarity,” I mean organizing a political system with decentralized power so that social
problems are dealt with by officials closest to the problem, partly as a way to increase civic
engagement. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339 (1994).
160. These points overlap with the familiar argument for federalism, and so a criticism of this
argument could be that instead of substituting federal mandates and subsidies for federal taxation, we
could instead devolve more of these duties to the states. For similar issues regarding the federal subsidy
for charities in a federal system, see Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 777 (2012).
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more damaging to democracy than a similar concentration of wealth and power
in government.161 Suppose, for example, that government simply contracted out
all national defense to a single private company and mandated that citizens pay
an income-based fee directly to that company—I could imagine almost nothing
scarier. Thus, a large number of competing providers, each with relatively little
political power, would make the complexity of a quasi-public program more
palatable.
4. A Historical Trend
Complex and opaque policies may not be ideal, but they may also simply be
how the United States does policy. There is a large literature explaining how the
United States has, throughout its history, often taken a hidden or disguised
approach to government spending and government power in general, particu-
larly at the federal level, often by delegating that power to other actors.162 In
this view, the federal government was more active than conventionally thought
in the early years of the republic, but its actions were often obscured or
otherwise out of sight163 (and furthermore, many state governments heavily
regulated for the general welfare164).
Scholars such as Brian Balogh have argued that the laissez-faire and “eco-
nomic freedom” ideas embodied in, for example, the Supreme Court’s Lochner
decision,165 did not derive from a historical understanding of America’s legal
origins. Rather, laissez faire only became dominant in the relatively short period
between the end of Reconstruction in 1877 and the Panic of 1893.166 The more
explicitly active federal government that thereafter emerged in the Progressive
Era and, especially, the New Deal may have appeared to be something new,
but it was actually consistent with earlier government intervention and
regulation—it was just the manner of intervention that was different. The
difference was that the federal government began doing more of what the states
and localities had once done,167 and it did it more directly rather than indirectly.168
161. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate
Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193, 1238–41 (2004).
162. See, e.g., BALOGH, supra note 39; Clemens, supra note 22.
163. The government action also focused on issues like internal improvement; regulation of borders
and territories; financial, economic, and market regulation; and morality. Thus, although the state was
always active, it was fiscally light because it focused more on regulation of private behavior than on
direct provision of goods. See, e.g., BALOGH, supra note 39, at 151–218 (discussing borders and
territories); LARSON, supra note 39, at 3–7; NOVAK, supra note 39, at 83–113, 149–89 (discussing market
regulation and morality regulation).
164. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 39 (showing that a well-regulated society was a central concern of
colonial and early state governments).
165. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
166. See BALOGH, supra note 39, at 14–17, 309–15; NOVAK, supra note 39, at 239–41.
167. See, e.g., NOVAK, supra note 39, at 42–50 (discussing the state common law roots of the
“well-regulated society”).
168. See, e.g., BALOGH, supra note 39, at 384–92. States differed in the degree of regulation, of
course. Robin Einhorn notes a pattern in that northern non-slaveholding states tended to produce
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But the American approach to more out-of-sight regulation, particularly on
distributional issues, continued. Much of the New Deal itself was designed to
mask the degree of redistribution in programs such as Social Security.169 In the
post-war period, after the income tax became a mass tax, social welfare
spending through the Tax Code in the form of tax expenditures became more
important.170 And even early Progressive Era reformers emphasized a coopera-
tive approach, involving state and local governments as well as private organiza-
tions rather than simply top-down federal regulation.171
Quasi-public spending could be viewed as the latest iteration of this Ameri-
can approach to hidden government regulation. It differs from some earlier
versions of hidden government action in that quasi-public spending, as I de-
scribe it, is focused on provision of goods and not primarily about broader
economic regulation or redistribution. The earlier forms of out-of-sight regula-
tion that historians and scholars of government have focused on thus far relate
more to market regulation, state power, and risk-sharing and risk-shifting,172 for
example, than to paying for goods and services.
But despite these differences, quasi-public spending may be consistent with
the broader historical trend toward out-of-sight governing. This is not necessar-
ily a theoretical defense of quasi-public spending—its complex and opaque
nature may still make it theoretically inferior to direct public spending in many
cases. But progressives and others who support government spending should
consider whether they ought to make the perfect the enemy of the good. As
Brian Balogh has written:
[G]overnance out of sight “works” in the sense that Americans accept it.
Indeed, they demand it. That is why I urge progressives to embrace this
historical tendency, rather than fight it. Progressives must concentrate on the
ends—redistributive, just, representative—rather than bogging down in battles
over the means—“statist,” conspicuous, and centralizing.173
C. EXISTING MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS
Both the ACA and income-driven student loans are iterative changes to an
existing set of health care and higher education institutions, respectively. These
“stronger and more competent governments in early American history” because slaveholders often saw
government power and competence as a threat to their interests and acted to prevent it. ROBIN L.
EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 7 (2006) (emphasis removed). That said, the state-
sanctioned power to own another human being is, in a sense, an extreme form of economic regulatory
power.
169. See BALOGH, supra note 39, at 392–94; MICHELMORE, supra note 27, at 5–7.
170. See, e.g., HOWARD, HIDDEN WELFARE STATE, supra note 23, at 11–12 (noting that the size and
scope of tax expenditures derive in part from underlying changes in tax rates and other policies); id. at
34–39 (discussing growth over time); MICHELMORE, supra note 27, at 152–60.
171. See BALOGH, supra note 39, at 353, 384; MICHELMORE, supra note 27, at 37–39.
172. On the role of government in risk-sharing and risk-shifting, see DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE
FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002).
173. BALOGH, supra note 39, at 397.
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institutions include not only the provider entities themselves, but also the legal
and economic structures and especially the existing markets. Both programs
overlay upon these existing markets and institutions and use them to synthesize
an effect similar to direct public spending. This is in contrast to, say, full
nationalization, but it is also in contrast to direct public spending. Even if the
providers remained the same, the market would be drastically different if the
government became the direct purchaser of the good.174
Although we certainly would not describe these markets—either before these
policies or after—as purely competitive, they still have many of the benefits of
competitive markets. It is well understood that markets are generally more able
than a central planner to determine prices and the information that goes into
prices. There are many reasons for this, but particularly relevant are theories of
regulatory design that emphasize the difficulties government agencies have with
processing the information required to price or otherwise configure regulatory
instruments. For example, a government agency tasked with determining the
appropriate amount of money to direct toward a university is unlikely to be able
to process the amount of information needed to correctly answer the question. A
market-price-setting mechanism is far more able to accurately price the good.175
These points are boilerplate in considering public versus private activity.
How much market efficiency do we sacrifice in turning to the public sector? Do
market failures or distributional concerns justify that sacrifice? Quasi-public
spending shows, however, that it need not be a binary choice between the public
sector and private markets. If designed well, a quasi-public spending program
can maintain some of the price-setting benefits of private markets even while
addressing broader public goals.
An additional aspect of using existing markets and institutions is that the
quasi-public program needs to take them into account, and the existing institu-
tional structure may not be well suited for quasi-public spending. It may be that
quasi-public spending works best as an overlay on largely private markets and
institutions176 but may not work as well as an adjustment to some largely public
structures.177 As I discuss below, I find that a quasi-public spending model
would not work well for K–12 education because of its current decentralized
174. Above, I compared a tax-funded voucher program with quasi-public spending and suggested
that the only real difference is the financing mechanism, not the degree of government power or
consumer choice. See supra Section IV.A.3. If a voucher program were implemented that had the same
effect as the ACA, it likely would take advantage of the existing market in the same way the ACA does.
175. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administra-
tive State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 58–59 (2011).
176. See James M. Poterba, Government Intervention in the Markets for Education and Health
Care: How and Why?, in INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE,
AND LONG-TERM CARE IN AMERICA 277, 291 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996) (stating that “[m]andates require
a well-functioning private market for the mandated good or service if they are to succeed”).
177. This takes into account, again, that institutions exist on a public-private continuum. See supra
note 15 and accompanying text.
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nature and reliance on local property taxes for funding.178
D. FLEXIBLE STRUCTURE
A direct public spending program normally raises money through the tax
system and then spends the money on the provision of a good or service. That
relatively simple structure, especially on the revenue side, means that in many
cases the distributional effect will be just the incidence of the benefit offset by
any cost of the tax.179 Quasi-public spending, by contrast, requires the use of
several different instruments to get the same effect. Although this leads to some
of the complexity discussed in section IV.B above, it also allows policymakers a
wider range of possible distributional adjustments. They could choose to have
more or less redistribution than a tax-funded direct public spending program—
which would also mean that the program could be more or less distortionary
than a direct public spending program.
To start, consider that paying a market price for a good or service is not
distortionary or inefficient in the way that a tax payment is. This is because the
person receives a good or service of equal or greater value for the payment, and
thus the person’s labor is not devalued in terms of consumption choices—a
person gets something in exchange for paying a price, but not necessarily for
paying a tax. Similarly, financing the public purchase of a good with individual
taxes equal to, or less than, the benefit to a given individual would also not be
distortionary because the combination of the tax and the good would leave that
person no worse off and perhaps better off.180 Any distortion would come only
from the degree of redistribution—taxing or charging some individuals more
than their benefit in order to finance subsidies to other individuals.181 Thus, if
the distributional adjustment in a quasi-public spending program had the effect
of raising effective marginal tax rates in the same way that a purely tax-funded
program would, we would “obtain the standard distortionary result” as from
178. See infra Section VI.A.
179. More complex structures are possible, particularly if the direct public spending program uses a
dedicated tax, has a complicated means-tested benefit formula, or both.
180. See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of
Taxation, 49 NAT’L TAX J. 513, 520 (1996); Poterba, supra note 176, at 291–92. If the good was already
in the individual’s consumption bundle before being publicly provided, then the consumption bundle
and budget constraint would be basically unchanged—the money that went to the good now goes to
taxes, but the rest of the consumption bundle is the same. If the good is a new one, then at worst the
individual receives no utility from it, but the tax is essentially a lump-sum tax and therefore has no
substitution effect—it does not affect work incentives. See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple
Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 181 (1989) (comparing mandated benefits to
lump-sum taxes); Poterba, supra note 176, at 291 (same). The better case is that there is at least some
offsetting utility from the good, such that an individual would be better off shifting at least some of his
prior consumption toward the taxes for the good.
181. Summers, supra note 180, at 180–81 (“In terms of their allocational effects on employment,
mandated benefits represent a tax at a rate equal to the difference between the employer[’]s cost of
providing the benefit and the employee’s valuation of it, not at a rate equal to the cost to the employer
of providing the benefit.” (emphasis in original)).
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typical taxation.182 But, importantly, the effective marginal tax rates could be
lower—or higher.
In practice, it seems likely that the net redistribution will be lower under a
quasi-public spending program than under a direct public spending program,
and this is precisely because the program makes little sense if cost and benefit
are not somewhat tied together for most individuals.183 If the core of the
program is having individuals purchase the good for its price, in part out of a
desire to retain existing markets and institutions and to hide the government’s
direct involvement, then making someone’s net cost exactly equal to their net
tax-and-transfer payments would defeat those purposes. More likely is that the
subsidies will be just enough to make the good affordable to those at the lower
end of the income distribution, and any high-end taxes will be just enough to
offset that cost.
For example, income-driven student loan repayment could operate much like
a tax on college graduates—indeed, the only core difference is that a graduate
tax would be mandated, whereas loans are opt-in. But PAYE asks borrowers to
pay using essentially two payment brackets—0% for income less than 150% of
the relevant poverty line and 10% for income that exceeds that threshold.184
Contrast that with the statutory income tax rate schedule, with rates rising up to
39.6% (and higher when other taxes and phase-outs are included).185 Further-
more, the benefit of a student loan is essentially uniform to everyone, in contrast
to many means-tested transfer programs.186 There is thus far less net redistribu-
tion under PAYE than there would likely be under tax-funded direct public
spending on higher education. But future programs could differ and ultimately
have more redistribution.
Another aspect of design flexibility is that policymakers can focus the
program on the users of the good or service rather than all taxpayers. This
further helps to keep a tight connection between the cost and the benefit, as
opposed to raising money in part from individuals who do not receive any direct
benefit from the good. Similarly, using a price mechanism helps to keep some of
the subsidies directed at inframarginal purchasers of the good rather than all
purchasers.187 If government instead provided the good to everyone, it might
distort the behavior of individuals who were already purchasing a large amount
of the good. By forcing them to purchase that additional desired amount for a
higher price, quasi-public spending can avoid over-subsidizing those in this
182. Kaplow, supra note 180, at 516.
183. See Summers, supra note 180, at 181 (“Without close links between taxes and benefits, that
tend to be lacking in public programs, large distortions can result.”).
184. See supra Section I.B.
185. I.R.C. § 1 (2012).
186. That is, all borrowers receive the higher education. Under a means-tested transfer program,
everyone pays higher taxes but only qualifying individuals receive the benefit.
187. See Poterba, supra note 176, at 291 (“[O]pen-ended mandates avoid distorting the behavior of
higher-consumption households.”); Summers, supra note 180, at 180–81.
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group. To be clear, however, this does not mean that there would not still be
potential distortions from the degree of redistribution.188
Countering this is the view in the economics literature on optimal taxation
that commodities should be taxed uniformly when an income tax is available to
handle distributional adjustments.189 To the degree that a quasi-public spending
program includes cross-subsidies from some purchasers of the good to other
purchasers, that can act as a differential commodity tax, contrary to the Atkinson-
Stiglitz result.190 Thus, quasi-public spending will often not be the first-best
policy option to enable public spending on particular goals or to address the
distributional issues that may affect some individuals’ abilities to purchase those
goods. In many cases, cash grants through the tax system would lead to higher
overall welfare—though, importantly, not in all cases.191
An additional feature that could affect the degree of economic distortion in a
quasi-public spending program is salience, that is, the degree to which an
individual is aware of and responsive to the particular instrument. If the
distributional adjustments embedded in a quasi-public spending program are
less salient than in an equivalent tax, then there may be less effect on behavior
for the same degree of redistribution.192 For example, I have argued that a
higher interest rate on student loans using income-driven repayment could
provide some redistribution to fund the subsidies for lower-income borrow-
ers.193 If those higher interest rates are less salient than taxes, then income-
driven repayment could fund higher education subsidies with less distortion
than tax-funded grants.
V. A FRAMEWORK FOR QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING
Having described quasi-public spending and isolated some of its key features
and its key differences from direct public spending, I now turn to specifying a
188. See Poterba, supra note 176, at 291 n.12 (““Mandates can avoid the distortions associated with
providing a given level of a good or service to all individuals, but they cannot avoid the distortions that
follow from attempts to redistribute resources across households.”).
189. See, e.g., ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY: RETROSPECTIVE AND
PROSPECTIVE VIEWS 58–60 (2012); KAPLOW, supra note 42, at 127–33.
190. See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation,
6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 74 (1976) (presenting a theoretical result that an income tax is more economically
efficient than a differential commodity tax because it would distort only labor markets as opposed to
distorting both labor and product markets).
191. See, e.g., KAPLOW, supra note 42, at 175–77 (discussing reasons why in-kind transfers may be
preferred over cash transfers, including myopia on the part of beneficiary groups, externalities surround-
ing particular goods, correction of suboptimal parenting choices, and encouragement of goods comple-
mentary to labor to offset work disincentives from taxation generally).
192. See generally Gamage, supra note 49; Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in
Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2011). The deadweight loss, or excess burden, of taxation is a
function of both the tax rate and the compensated price elasticity of demand. See ROSEN & GAYER, supra
note 87, at 332. If the tax or other adjustment is less salient, that may lower the magnitude of the
elasticity, leading in turn to less deadweight loss than another instrument, even if the effective tax rate
is the same.
193. Brooks, supra note 54, at 279–81.
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theory and framework for when policymakers should consider employing a
quasi-public spending model. My purpose here is to help policymakers think
about and design quasi-public spending in a principled way, focusing on the
possible benefits of the system rather than simply the political optics. This is, of
course, merely a first step, and I hope others will correct, complicate, and
extend these ideas.
Stated simply, when policymakers wish to pay for a good in a public manner,
a quasi-public model may be a viable alternative to direct public spending,
provided certain criteria are satisfied. First, the good or service and its approxi-
mate value should be clearly identifiable. Second, the identified private benefit
should be large relative to the diffuse public benefits. Third, the pool of
potential consumers should be large and diverse, especially across income
groups. Finally, there should be an existing set of institutions, public or private,
already providing the good.
These same criteria will also often apply when simple tax expenditures may
be effective. As discussed above, some tax expenditures are a subset of quasi-
public spending, but they are not the only form of hidden government spending.
This Part concludes with a brief comparison to tax expenditures to clarify when
non–tax expenditure forms of quasi-public spending may be most appropriate.
A. IDENTIFIABLE AND DISCRETE MARKET GOODS
A central feature of a quasi-public spending program is the separation of the
purchase of the good from the distributional adjustments through subsidies and
taxes. Thus, there must be at least somewhat of a market-price-setting mecha-
nism for the good, so the existence of a market is a necessary condition.
But more fundamentally, we need to clearly identify and separate the good
itself because ultimately the quasi-public spending program will tell individuals
to go out and buy the good. Classic public goods, by contrast, are far too diffuse
to be captured and described as single goods with prices—they are not sepa-
rable into individual consumption items. Clean air, national defense, a monetary
system—to try to isolate these as marketable goods is incoherent. We can
certainly decide through the political process how much to value them and
therefore how much tax revenue government should spend on their maintenance
(and also how progressively that revenue should be raised)—but it would be
absurd to say that we should provide for them by mandating that individuals go
into the market to purchase their allocable shares of each.
This is not to say, however, that the goods have to be strictly and limitedly
defined like items on a store’s shelves. The two key examples I use in this
Article are health care and higher education. Each of these is in fact a complex
bundle of goods, with many different variations in the bundles depending on
individual preferences and market demand. The elements of the bundles have
varied cost structures, positive (and negative) externalities, capital and labor
intensities, rates of inflation, and so on. But our market system has, more or
less, been able to put a single, reasonably accurate price on these bundles of
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goods—health insurance premiums and tuition, respectively. This is sufficient to
make them candidates for quasi-public spending.
B. LARGE PRIVATE BENEFIT
Related to the prior point is the idea that the goods should have large private
benefits relative to public benefits. This is, in part, why there is at least a
somewhat functioning market for the good in the first place. If most of the value
of a good comes from its benefits to the broader public, rather than the
individual purchaser, then the market would likely fail without a substantial
Pigouvian subsidy.194 That is an alternative—and noncontradictory—form of
public intervention, but it serves a different purpose than quasi-public spending.
Quasi-public spending is a form of public payment for a good, not the correc-
tion of a market price.
When the private benefit is relatively high, there is little question that most
individuals would get substantial value from the good relative to its cost. Higher
education, despite its costs, continues to be a good investment, for example.195
And the insurance value of health insurance is substantial. Therefore, the
mandate or strong push to purchase the good is unlikely to result in a loss to an
individual or a large transfer ex ante from one group to another.196 In many
cases the only thing that is stopping some individuals from purchasing the good
is simply a lack of money (or access to credit) or perhaps an error in calculating
the value of the good.197 In these cases, quasi-public spending would reflect a
decision that a distributional adjustment is justified in order to enable such
people to purchase the good, but it would not necessarily be questioning the
underlying pricing and value.
Second, a large private benefit allows for separation of the provision of the
good from the central public finance system. Where an individual’s benefits are
her allocable share of diffuse public benefits, there is no real logic for trying to
break out the purchase and provision of the good from any other public
good—we would have to, for example, come up with a way to allocate the
benefits of pure public goods. For those goods, the metaphor of a single tax as
the price of civilization is stronger. But in situations where the government is
194. See supra note 104.
195. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 235–39.
196. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Insurance, of course, does result in a transfer ex
post—after the insured events have come to pass. But ex ante, people pay roughly an actuarially fair
risk-adjusted premium. In contrast, classic welfare transfers, which still have some insurance element,
see John R. Brooks, Fiscal Federalism as Risk-Sharing: The Insurance Role of Redistributive Taxation,
68 TAX L. REV. 89, 94–101 (2014), are also in large part ex ante transfers because the qualifying
event—low income—has already occurred at the time of transfer. A high-income person knows ex ante
that part of her tax payment will be redistributive and thus will not provide her as much direct private
benefit.
197. On the relevance of myopia to the decision of whether to provide goods in kind, see, for
example, KAPLOW, supra note 42, at 175–76; Summers, supra note 180, at 178 (noting the similarities
between paternalism and Musgrave’s notion of “merit good[s]”).
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simply a purchasing agent for a discrete good, the total social benefit of which is
largely the sum of individuals’ direct private benefits, there is no need to
agglomerate the good with other government-purchased goods. This is not to
say, however, that it is superior to create a separate financing mechanism—only
that it is practicable.
C. BROAD AND DIVERSE PARTICIPANT POOL
In order for the program to fulfill the quasi-public character, there must be a
broad enough pool of participants for sufficient redistribution and social insur-
ance. First, for redistribution, one needs both the poor—or else why bother?—
and the rich—or else where will the money come from? Many types of social
programs would fail this test, of course. Consider traditional welfare payments,
for example. Even if it were possible to determine a market price for the
services, asking the participants themselves to fund the program would defeat
the purpose. This is why purely redistributive transfers belong within the central
public finance system. Although quasi-public spending contains distributional
adjustments, its goal should primarily be good provision, not redistribution.
Second, social insurance and risk-pooling are key features. Because quasi-
public spending, like direct public spending, is particularly appropriate where
the cost of a particular good to an individual is high relative to his income, risk
of low income can be a major factor, and much of what a quasi-public spending
program accomplishes is the pooling of income risk. Thus, for quasi-public
spending to be effective in cases where there is income volatility, we need, first,
a large enough group to shrink the overall variance, and second, risks of low
(and high) income to be mostly uncorrelated across individuals.198 If the pool
has these features, then collective, progressive provision of the good or service
can be effective. Health care satisfies this condition easily because it covers
literally every person. And though the group of higher education recipients is
smaller than the group of health care recipients, it also skews toward higher
income recipients, which means lower risk and sufficient resources to spread
what risk there is at a reasonable cost.
Pushing against this are the typical forces of adverse selection and moral
hazard, which could act to undermine the risk pool. Thus, quasi-public spending
may only be appropriate in cases where those forces can be managed or where
tools like mandates can ensure that the good risks do not opt out entirely.199
D. DIVERSE NETWORK OF PROVIDERS
Finally, in addition to having a market price for the good, there ought to be an
existing diverse network of providers of the good, public and private. First, this
198. On the connection between taxation and social insurance, see Brooks, supra note 196, at
94–102.
199. There is a tension here with the liberty benefits discussed supra Section IV.B.3. Ultimately, it is
a political judgment as to how to balance these factors.
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is a corollary to the previous point that there ought to be an identifiable good
with a (more or less) market price. That implies a somewhat competitive
market, rather than a monopoly or oligopoly (or no market at all), and thus a
relatively reliable price-setting mechanism.
Second, we see in the cases of health insurance and higher education that
quasi-public spending relies on an existing institutional structure and network of
providers. If new types of entities and institutions have to be created from
scratch, then the program is no longer an iterative change to existing institu-
tions, but is instead a wholly formed, new institution. Without the economic and
legislative efficiencies that come from using existing institutions, the case for
quasi-public spending is substantially weaker. Third, creating or encouraging
new entities to provide the good risks triggering the problems CBO identified in
1994—if the providers owe their existence entirely to government, they may be
better perceived as government agents and therefore less likely to compete on
price and quality.200
Finally, recall that a possible advantage of quasi-public spending compared to
direct public spending is that the money is spread among the government,
providers, and individuals, rather than captured entirely by the government
through taxes. That is arguably more conducive to liberty, but not if there are
very few providers, even if they are nongovernmental. Effectively making a
single, large private entity into a tax collector would be dangerous to democ-
racy. Unless the resources can be spread among diverse and competitive provid-
ers, it may be better for the government to keep them.
E. QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING VERSUS TAX EXPENDITURES
The set of features described above flows from the fact that quasi-public
spending works best—and perhaps only—when it is overlaid on an existing,
functioning market.201 In this sense, quasi-public spending is essentially a “top
off” to fill a gap in the existing market. Tax expenditures can do the same but in
a more limited way.
For example, a tax expenditure generally operates as a deduction against
taxable income—that is, a particular expenditure is deducted from the income
tax base before calculating tax. This means that the subsidy rate is essentially
fixed by the marginal tax rate, which is unrelated to the subsidy itself or the
desired degree of redistribution. A tax credit may provide more flexibility,
however—and many subsidies are nominally structured as tax credits, such as
the premium assistance tax credits under the ACA202—but tax credits can also
200. For example, there does not appear to be much market benefit from contracting out prison
services to private prison companies. See, e.g., Alexander Volokh, Prison Accountability and Perfor-
mance Measures, 63 EMORY L.J. 339, 347 (2013).
201. See supra Section IV.C.
202. See I.R.C. § 36B (2012).
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be limited in their effectiveness, especially if they are not refundable.203
In addition to having less flexibility in the degree of redistribution, tax
expenditures also have less flexibility in the targets of redistribution. When
running everything through the Tax Code, the participant pool is essentially
everyone. Even those who do not purchase the good in question may be called
upon to subsidize another’s purchase of it. That may be appropriate in many
situations, but there may also be good reasons to limit the pool to those who
purchase the good. For example, asking the higher-income recipients of higher
education to disproportionately support the subsidies to low-income recipients
of higher education better reflects the disproportionate benefits they have
received.204
The main point, then, is that quasi-public spending is particularly flexible
because it is unconstrained by the tax system itself. Policymakers may choose to
use aspects of the tax system, such as with the ACA, but may also choose to
work largely outside of it, as with income-driven student loan repayment.
Indeed, student loans provide a good example of the limitations of the tax
system. There are a number of tax expenditures for higher education but, as
noted above, they have had limited effectiveness.205 Student loans, on the other
hand, have done much more to make higher education more widely available.
This may in part be because taxes are generally not particularly relevant for
students. Embedding the quasi-public spending within the loan system, rather
than the tax system, thus ensures more effective delivery of the policy.
VI. APPLICATIONS
In this Part, I briefly apply the prior Part’s framework to areas that could
possibly benefit from a quasi-public intervention: K–12 education, child care
and early education, and legal services.
A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION
Public primary and secondary education—K–12 education—is a major piece
of state and local government budgets, and it is expensive. It is labor intensive,
with low labor productivity growth, and it is not amenable to technological
improvements to boost productivity.206 There may be inefficiencies that can be
rooted out, but as long as we expect teacher salaries to at least keep pace with
average wage growth, we should expect public school budgets to rise faster than
the rate of inflation and to consume a growing share of overall spending. In
203. If a tax credit is not refundable, then it can only reduce taxes to $0. It thus provides little or no
benefit to low-income individuals who pay little or no income tax. A refundable credit, by contrast, can
lead to negative tax liability and thus operates essentially as a cash transfer without regard for income
tax liability.
204. See Brooks, supra note 54, at 279–81.
205. See supra note 35.
206. I do not know of a serious suggestion that there be online distance learning for kindergarten.
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many ways, it is a classic example of Baumol’s cost disease and the problem of
low labor productivity growth.207
Thus, we either need to resign ourselves to ever-rising school costs (and
therefore local property taxes) or consider another option. But what would a
quasi-spending model look like for K–12 education? It would essentially ask
families with children to pay schools directly as costs go up rather than put
those costs on property owners in general. The payments themselves would be
partly a function of income so as to be progressive and ease the burden of
higher costs on low-income people especially.
However, such a program would likely fail because the existing institutional
structure of K–12 education would not work well with a quasi-public spending
overlay. Because K–12 education is financed at the local level through local
property taxes, a quasi-public spending program similar to the ACA or income-
driven student loan repayment would not be a good fit. First, because many
school districts are segregated economically, the pool of potential participants
within a district is unlikely to have the income diversity needed to have
effective distributional adjustments. The pool of participants would instead have
to be drawn at the state or national level. Second, even a national program
would rely on an imperfect pool if it included only families with children
currently in school because those families are likely to have less disposable
income than families with no children or whose children have left the house-
hold. Although shifting the burden from all property owners to families with
school-aged children might tighten the connection between cost and benefit, it
would be a dramatic and likely regressive change.208
To make such a program work, there would have to be revenue raised from
relatively high-income people without children in high-income districts to fund
subsidies and other distributional adjustments for parents paying fees in low-
income districts. But this just highlights that from a fiscal and equity standpoint,
the most pressing problem with public schools is the distribution of resources as
a result of their current financing structure, not the overall level of resources.
The national per-pupil average annual spending is over $12,000,209 well above
the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) aver-
age,210 but with wide variations in spending across school districts. In the near
term, finding ways to better distribute that spending across uneven school
districts is more important than finding ways to finance an increase in the
207. See supra Section II.C.
208. The ratio of public spillovers to private benefit for K–12 education is likely more skewed
toward public benefit than the ratio is for higher education. If so, then the public should bear a larger
share of the cost of K–12 education than it should for higher education because it also gets a bigger
share of the total benefit. Thus, putting more of the burden on current parents is not as justified as
putting more of the cost of higher education on the student.
209. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS tbl.236.55 (2013), https://nces.
ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_236.55.asp [http://perma.cc/7KGM-QETS].
210. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS tbl.605.10 (2013), https://nces.
ed.gov/programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_605.10.asp [http://perma.cc/N6JB-K75N].
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overall level of spending. Thus, some sort of national-level equalization would
be a more natural first step rather than first implementing a quasi-public
cost-sharing program.
B. CHILD CARE AND EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION
In some ways, early childhood education is institutionally a closer analogy to
higher education than K–12 education. Both have historically had a large role
for private payments and a network of private providers (though with an
increasingly large government role) and thus are more institutionally amenable
to a quasi-public solution. In addition, early childhood education is a growth
area and therefore is in need of more funds. In 2013, only about 68% of
four-year-olds attended some form of preschool,211 yet research has now made
clear the importance of some sort of education for preschool-aged children.
Furthermore, child care is necessary to increase labor force participation, espe-
cially among women. But, like K–12 education, it faces the problem of high
labor costs and low labor productivity, leading to high and growing overall
costs. As with higher education, expanding access to early childhood education
and child care is thus a reasonable, perhaps vital, role for government.
Many states and districts already provide public pre-Kindergarten (pre-K).212
New York, in particular, has recently begun an ambitious, universal pre-K
expansion, and other states may follow. An important innovation of some of
these programs is using state income tax revenue rather than local property tax
revenue to fund the expansion—which partially solves the pooling problem that
K–12 education faces.213 But this nascent public system exists alongside an
existing, largely private, system of child care and preschool. That makes the
system complicated for purposes of the cross-subsidies in a quasi-public spend-
ing program, particularly because high-income people could choose free, public
pre-K in New York if they wished, thus potentially cutting off a source of
progressive funding.
Universal pre-K could instead take a different approach, one more like the
ACA.214 Families could purchase pre-K and child care in the private market but
211. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS tbl.202.10 (2014), https://nces.
ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/tables/dt14_202.10.asp [https://perma.cc/288E-QNUB].
212. Twenty-nine percent of four-year-olds are in a state-funded pre-K program. NAT’L INST. FOR
EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, THE STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2014: STATE PRESCHOOL YEARBOOK 6 (2015), http://nieer.
org/sites/nieer/files/Yearbook2014_full3.pdf [http://perma.cc/XX6P-Q249].
213. See supra Section VI.A.
214. The Center for American Progress recently proposed a partially refundable tax credit to pay for
the costs of child care. See KATIE HAMM & CARMEL MARTIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, A NEW VISION FOR
CHILD CARE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PROPOSED NEW TAX CREDIT TO EXPAND HIGH-QUALITY CHILD CARE 8
(2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/31111043/Hamm-Childcare-report.
pdf [http://perma.cc/X3A9-3KRU]. The proposal has been described as “Obamacare for child care.”
See Matthew Yglesias, Tax Credits to Pay for Child Care is the Next Frontier for the Nanny State, VOX
(Sept. 8, 2015, 7:00 AM), http://www.vox.com/2015/9/8/9262901/high-quality-child-care-tax-credit
[http://perma.cc/B5ZV-6GQV].
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with income-based subsidies for those with lower incomes. The subsidies could
come in the form of a voucher or tax credit, or could even be sent directly to
schools, like the method used for health insurance companies under the ACA.
That approach would likely have a much lower budget cost than the $1.5 billion
over five years that New York is projected to spend on universal pre-K because
more families would be paying out-of-pocket.215 The necessary revenue might
come from an incremental tax on high incomes, in order to have the distribu-
tional element of a quasi-public spending program, or from a higher list price
for the service, much like for higher education.216 Interestingly, New York City
Mayor Bill de Blasio originally proposed during his 2013 mayoral campaign to
pay for expanded early childhood education with a small tax increase on
incomes above $500,000.217 But that was assuming full public spending; an
incremental tax to fund means-tested subsidies could be much smaller.
An important design question, therefore, would be whether to use a voucher
system or other quasi-public spending program to add incremental redistribution
to the current system of private expenditures or whether early childhood
education should simply be paid for wholesale by the government, funded by
general tax revenue. Given cost disease pressures and the inevitable growth of
the government sector, there may be good reasons for a gradual approach so as
not to crowd out other programs. It may be better, for example, to use the same
tax increase suggested by de Blasio to fund a less expensive voucher program,
with the balance used to shore up K–12 schools.218 Direct payments by parents
to providers would make up the difference. The total cost to many people may
not be that different than under direct public spending, but the lower nominal
taxes would mean less budget pressure.
To be clear, the idea of providing means-tested vouchers for preschool is not
particularly novel, and some communities have already implemented it.219
Furthermore, this is not intended to be a full examination of the relevant issues.
But framing a system of private expenditures, subsidized with means-tested
vouchers, as a quasi-public form of collective spending allows a clearer compari-
son to direct public spending, particularly for the distributional consequences.
Indeed, an important difference between the typical voucher proposal and a
215. See Reid Wilson, New York Will Begin Universal Pre-Kindergarten, WASH. POST (Mar. 31,
2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/03/31/new-york-will-begin-universal-
pre-kindergarten/ [http://wapo.st/1pzlKi7].
216. If the latter, then the subsidies would happen partly at the school level through increased
financial aid.
217. See, e.g., Javier C. Herna´ndez, Cost of Educating New York City’s 4-Year-Olds Proves Difficult
to Calculate, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/nyregion/cost-of-educating-
new-york-citys-4-year-olds-proves-difficult-to-calculate.html?smidpl-share [https://perma.cc/7QED-
XK53].
218. Another issue would be quality and accountability because a voucher program would still rely
on private providers. Experience with voucher programs for K–12 education shows that this is a real
concern. Thus, there would be a need for regulation and oversight, see supra Section III.A.3, though, of
course, this would be true for expanded public early childhood education as well.
219. See generally NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, supra note 212.
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quasi-public spending program is that the typical voucher is just a lump-sum
substitute for full, direct public spending—providing individuals with a fixed
voucher equal to the average per-pupil cost. The purpose of such vouchers is
only an attempt to use a market mechanism, rather than a political or agency
decision, to allocate the funds.220 In a quasi-public spending program, however,
the voucher would be variable in order to cover only the distributional correc-
tion needed to make the purchase reasonably affordable.221
C. LEGAL SERVICES
Like education and health care, the legal industry has relatively low productiv-
ity growth and thus has costs rising faster than average. Although technology
supplies some boost—legal research, for example, takes much less time than it
did previously—a given associate can still only read so many contracts or draft
so many briefs in a day. And sure enough, hourly fees have risen at roughly a
3.6% annual rate over the last ten years, and clients are increasingly groaning
under the weight of their legal expenses.222
That alone does not necessarily mean that something must be done. Perhaps
lawyers are like household servants, a service that will gradually diminish as the
wages demanded by highly educated individuals become more and more unaf-
fordable to clients. But lawyers do, of course, provide something special,
namely access to the bodies of law that guide almost every interaction between
individuals and business entities in the modern world, not to mention access to
our justice system. They are an indispensable part of the modern regulatory
state.223 Although there may be arguments about exactly how many lawyers we
need, and whether we now have too many or too few, it is not a service that we
can let die off, nor should we let the cost structure lead to distributional
differences in access to justice.224 Legal services are thus arguably the sort of
220. Another purpose may be to use public funds to pay for religious education. See, e.g., Stephanie
Saul, Public Money Finds Back Door to Private Schools, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/05/22/education/scholarship-funds-meant-for-needy-benefit-private-schools.html [https://perma.
cc/DY9Y-ASL5].
221. This is similar to the design of the premium assistance tax credit under the ACA, where the
credit is the difference between the cost of the “applicable second lowest cost silver plan” and an
applicable percentage of the taxpayer’s income. I.R.C. § 36B(b)(2)(B) (2012). In other words, the credit
is intended only to bring the out-of-pocket cost down to a particular percentage of income. This is in
contrast to, for example, proposals to simply give every citizen a fixed insurance voucher amount. See,
e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A PREMIUM SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR MEDICARE: ANALYSIS OF ILLUSTRATIVE
OPTIONS 1–2 (2013) (analyzing congressional proposals to provide Medicare recipients with a premium
support amount that would be equal across most recipients, adjusted only for health and age).
222. See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., 2015 REPORT ON
THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 5 (2015), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/centers-institutes/
legal-profession/upload/FINAL-Report-1-7-15.pdf [http://perma.cc/9M73-KUBX].
223. Ironically, increasing the use of quasi-public spending may mean an increasing role for lawyers
because they could, in effect, be the government’s agents for implementing a particular policy through
private actors.
224. It feels incredibly quaint and naı¨ve to write this sentence, given how clearly income and wealth
correlate with access to legal services. But that does not mean it is appropriate.
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good a society might want to finance collectively, and so we should at least ask
the question of whether there is a reasonable collective response.225
The medical industry once faced a similar problem but solved it (for a while)
with health insurance. There have been proposals for legal insurance,226 but
they have never really gone anywhere, largely out of moral hazard concerns—
there are fewer barriers against becoming litigious than against becoming
unhealthy or injured, for example.227 Alternatively, there are legal aid services
and similar public programs funded from tax revenue and contributions from
attorneys, but they are woefully inadequate in meeting the demand. Although
we could dramatically increase funding for legal services, that raises the famil-
iar problem of an expanded government sector bumping up against budget
constraints or crowding out other government programs.
What might a quasi-public spending program for legal services look like?
Two possible options are expanded pro bono requirements228 and funding of
legal services by other lawyers rather than taxpayers and donors. Either of these
options would take the form of a transfer from clients who can pay full price to
those who cannot, consistent with the distributional adjustments under the ACA
or PAYE. If attorneys have a substantial pro bono requirement, for example,
they might charge higher hourly fees for their paying clients. Similarly, if state
bars required greater payments into a legal services fund, that also likely would
be passed on to paying clients.
Again, these proposals are not particularly novel. However, it is perhaps
novel to see them not merely as ways to expand access to justice, but as ways to
collectively purchase a more socially optimal amount of legal services in the
face of rising costs.
CONCLUSION
This Article has introduced the concept of quasi-public spending to describe a
new approach to the public financing of goods and services. The Article’s claim
is that programs for the collective and progressive provision of certain goods
can be (and often already are) accomplished through a synthesis of private
spending by individuals and incremental government subsidies and taxes, as
opposed to full, tax-funded direct public spending. At a first approximation, this
225. It should be noted, however, that the positive externalities from legal services are perhaps less
obvious or salient than for education. Most probably agree that everyone benefits from an educated
populace, but it’s not as immediately clear that everyone benefits from, for instance, a lawyer helping
with an individual’s divorce. But the externalities are still there—smoothing out disputes, efficiently
navigating the court system, managing legal risk before entering into a transaction or relationship,
helping to ensure compliance with the public purposes of laws—these are all things that benefit society
as well as the clients themselves.
226. See, e.g., Preble Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 417 (1968) (discussing prior proposals).
227. See id. at 425–36.
228. For example, New York now requires fifty hours of pro bono work for bar admission. 22 N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 520.16a (McKinney 2015).
2016] 1109QUASI-PUBLIC SPENDING
describes both the ACA and income-driven student loan repayment for higher
education. Although both these programs are relatively small today, widespread
adoption of each would have a similar societal effect as full public funding of
each but with much of the spending still nominally private.
This Article further shows that in certain situations, using a quasi-public
spending design for a large-scale public spending program may be a reasonable
alternative to other structures. This challenges the conventional wisdom that it
is best for public programs to be on-budget and funded directly out of tax
revenue. The standard argument that citizens ought to know of the existence and
cost of public programs is compelling. Yet that benefit has costs: higher taxes, a
larger public sector, and perhaps less likelihood of enactment.
In situations where the government may need to become the purchaser of a
good in order to counter distributional limitations on individual purchases—
such as with pre-ACA health care and pre-PAYE higher education—a quasi-
public spending program can provide a way to achieve the government’s
allocative and distributional objectives with a smaller public sector, greater
reliance on existing markets and institutions, greater policy flexibility, and more
diffusion of power. In that situation, the right answer is no longer quite as
obvious. Although quasi-public spending is not suited for all government
activity, it is nonetheless a tool that policymakers and academics should take
seriously.
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